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Abstract 
The Air Combat Command (ACC) Inspector General (IG) assesses the 
operational readiness and combat effectiveness of units by evaluating individual wings.  
Today’s conflicts, however, are waged as a joint force.  The Joint Forces Commander 
(JFCC) leverages the resources of the entire military complex to achieve strategic 
objectives.  The synergistic effects, created by the integration of individual weapon 
systems, produce greater results than the individual components.  Evaluating wings 
outside the joint System of Systems (SoS) architecture doesn’t provide a true assessment 
of combat readiness.  Using a case study method, this research examines the integration 
of a joint SoS architecture with the ACC/IG inspection system.  This study assesses the 
current nature of military operations and the risks associated with joint operations.  It 
recommends ACC/IG assess the following four joint characteristics during inspections: 
rapid integration, interoperability, joint training, and flexibility/adaptability.  It outlines 
several joint exercises as areas for implementing a joint inspection system.  Finally, this 
study explores limitations and counter arguments to adopting a joint SoS within the 
inspection system.  This analysis recommends the ACC/IG assess units through a larger 
SoS framework, which offers the possibility to reduce integration risks prior to 
deployment and provide a better assessment of wing readiness. 
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AIR FORCE INSPECTION SYSTEM:  A SYSTEM-OF-SYSTEMS DILEMMA  
I.  Introduction 
General Background 
An uncertain global economy, new technological developments, and growing 
competition for natural resources create a constantly shifting global environment.  The 
United States (US) Government continuously monitors this changing environment and 
assesses the impact on US national interests.  The President of the United States 
(POTUS), through the direction of the national strategy, establishes the priorities for US 
national interests.  The US government relies on the four elements of national power to 
preserve and defend the national strategy and shape the global environment1.  As one of 
the four elements, the nation may call upon the US military on a moment’s notice to 
secure and defend those national interests. 
As US global policy and national strategy changes, so must the US military.  
Admiral Mullins, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs (CJCS), acknowledged this need in 
the 2011 National Military Strategy writing, “While the strength of our military will 
continue to underpin national security, we must continuously adapt our approaches to 
how we exercise power” (Mullins, 2011).  The current trends in global change present 
                                                
 
 
 
1  The four tools available to the US government are:  Diplomatic, Information, Military, and 
Economic.  These four tools are often referred to as DIME 
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new challenges for the US military, which in order to ensure an always ready and capable 
force, must also evolve.  Admiral Mullins further codified this trend stating (2011): 
“In this interdependent world, the enduring interests of the United States 
are increasingly tied to those of other state and non-state actors. The 
complexity of this global system and the challenges therein demand that 
we – the Joint Force – think anew about how we lead.” 
 
Today’s military operates as a joint force, combining the capabilities, resources, 
and knowledge of the three military branches to increase lethality, flexibility, and 
responsiveness2.  Strategic, operational, and tactical planning and execution span all three 
branches.  Evolving tactics techniques, and procedures (TTPs), technology, 
communications systems, and weapons, used by US and adversarial forces continue to 
increase the complexity of warfare.  These evolving factors continue to increase the 
reliance on and integration of the US service branches.  The armed forces of the US, 
when operating as a joint force, reflect a System of Systems (SoS) architecture (see 
Methodology, Assumptions, and Limitations section for a definition of SoS).  According 
to Joint Publication (JP) 1 (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2009): 
“The nature of the challenges to the United States and its interests demand 
that the Armed Forces operate as a fully integrated joint team across the 
range of military operations…The challenges are best met when the 
unified action of the Armed Forces elicits the maximum contribution from 
each Service…The resulting synergy from their synchronized and 
integrated action is a direct reflection of those capabilities.  Joint warfare 
                                                
 
 
 
2 For the purpose of this thesis, the three military service branches refer to the Army, Air Force, 
and Navy.  The Marines and Coast Guard are considered service components of the US Navy. 
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is team warfare.  Effective integration of joint forces exposes no weak 
points or seams to an adversary.” 
 
The terms “fully integrated”, “joint team”, “unified action”, “synergy”, and 
“synchronized and integrated” alluded to the existence of a joint SoS architecture.  The 
DoD’s Systems Engineering Guide for Systems of Systems in facts states the “way 
military commanders bring together forces and systems to achieve a military objective,” 
operates as SoS (ODUSD(A&T)SSE, 2008).  Further the guide states that acknowledging 
the SoS perspective is critical to the future development of the military force 
(ODUSD(A&T)SSE, 2008).  The Joint Chiefs of Staff definition for integration states 
“The arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force that operates by 
engaging as a whole” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014).  Compared to the DoD definition of a 
SoS, the Joint Chiefs are essentially using the word integration as a substitute for SoS.  
As such, each branch must view its capabilities within the joint architecture, 
acknowledging how they integrate, operate, and achieve success within this construct.  
Further, the characteristics of a joint SoS architecture are manifested in the United States 
Air Force (USAF) vision, core competencies, and distinctive capabilities.  Each of these 
elements reference the needs to support, interoperate, or provide for the joint team (Air 
Combat Command, 2013). 
Air Combat Command (ACC) relies on the Inspector General (IG) to evaluate 
unit combat readiness.  The IG manages the Air Force Inspection System (AFIS), which 
uses a variety of tools (interviews, inspections, checklists, surveys, self-evaluations, and 
staged exercises) to evaluate a unit’s ability to fulfill its wartime mission(s) (United 
States Air Force, 2013).  “The intent of the IG is to continuously improve the AFIS so 
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there is an ever-shrinking difference--both real and perceived--between mission readiness 
and inspection readiness” (United States Air Force, 2013). 
Currently the ACC/IG inspects a single wing at a time and thus does not 
incorporate a SoS perspective to account for the co-dependency and integration of wings 
with other Air Force (AF), Army, Navy, or even coalition partners/weapon systems.  
According to JP-1, the NMS, and 2001, 2006, and 2011 Quadrennial Defense Reviews 
(QDR), integration and interoperability are necessary for today’s military to achieve 
operational and ultimately strategic success.  These key strategic documents define 
several joint characteristics not fully evaluated during ACC/IG inspections (see Chapter 4 
for a list of characteristics).  The NMS provides a general summary of these documents 
stating the changing global environment and the complex challenges this environment 
bring, demand a fully integrated joint force capable of working as one (Mullins, 2011).  
While not explicitly stated, these documents are referring to the existence of a joint SoS 
and the need to develop forces who can quickly assimilate into the SoS.  This work 
acknowledges the existence of a joint SoS and the need to evaluate weapon systems 
within this architecture.  The only way to measure a unit’s capability to meet joint 
hallmarks is to evaluate a unit under similar conditions.  This work validates the concern 
that single wing inspections fall short of capturing the interdependent relationships 
characteristic of joint operations.   
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Problem Statement 
Today’s joint operational environment is a large system of systems, relying on the 
symbiotic relationships which form between weapon systems to create synergistic effects 
on the battlefield.  JP-1 summarizes this relationship stating (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2000): 
“Joint warfare is team warfare. The engagement of forces is not a series of 
individual performances linked by a common theme; rather, it is the 
integrated and synchronized application of all appropriate capabilities.  
The synergy that results from the operations of joint forces according to 
joint doctrine maximizes combat capability in unified action.” 
 
It is therefore less effective to evaluate a wing outside the joint construct where its 
impact on the SoS cannot be assessed.  The Commander of ACC (COMACC) relies upon 
the ACC/IG to assess the combat readiness and effectiveness of its assigned forces.  
However, the current inspection system does not acknowledge the intra and inter-service 
relationships, which form during joint operations and are necessary for mission success.  
In addition, the current AFIS process of evaluating a single wing at a time runs counter to 
ACC’s strategic vision, which seeks to develop airmen capable of working as integral 
parts of the joint force.  According to Air Force Instruction (AFI) 90-201, inspection 
programs should be consistent with command mission requirements, and are “inherently 
wasteful if not directly aligned with mission readiness” (Secretary of the Air Force, 
2012).  CJCS Guidance 3401D defines readiness as the synthesis of joint forces at the 
operational and tactical levels culminating “in the Combatant Commanders' ability to 
integrate and synchronize ready combat and support forces to execute assigned missions” 
(Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013).  This statement from General Dempsey 
connects mission readiness with joint readiness.  Accordingly, ACC strives to develop 
airmen with the proper training, equipment, and resources necessary to project combat 
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power, anytime, anyplace, in order to create effects and conditions aligned with joint 
objectives (Hostage, 2012). 
Hypothesis 
An AFIS which views a wing’s mission within the context of the joint SoS 
architecture will provide a better evaluation of a wing’s combat readiness and 
effectiveness. 
Investigative Questions 
The following research questions seek to confirm this work’s hypothesis and lead 
to the development of recommendations to improve the current ACC/IG system.  The 
main research question is: 
How can the AFIS be improved to account for the integrated nature of military 
warfare reflective of a System-of-Systems architecture? 
Specific investigative questions include: 
1. How does the Air Force align/posture forces for joint operations? 
2. What is the focus of the current ACC/IG Inspection system? 
3. How does the current inspection system account for the integrated nature of 
military assets during operations? 
4. What system-of-systems examples or incidents exist that have a direct relation 
to an operational readiness inspection? 
5. What system-of-systems metrics or attributes can be used to evaluate and 
determine the status and health of ACC units? 
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Research Focus 
The primary focus of this thesis is two fold.  First is to establish modern warfare 
as a SoS operation where the importance of a wing’s role relies on the relationships 
formed between the individual components comprising the SoS.  Second is to 
demonstrate how evaluating a wing’s combat readiness outside the SoS construction 
creates additional risk during joint operations. 
Methodology, Assumptions, and Limitations 
This work uses an embedded case study research method to answer the main 
research question (Yin, 2009).  The cost and time of implementing recommendations is 
outside the scope of this work.  In addition, while recommendations may apply to other 
service branches and AF Major Commands (MAJCOM), this work focuses on ACC and 
its IG. 
This thesis uses the Department of Defense’s (DoD) definition for system of 
systems, which states a SoS is “a set or arrangement of systems that results when 
independent and useful systems are integrated into a larger system that delivers unique 
capabilities” (Department of Defense, 2004) (ODUSD(A&T)SSE, 2008).  Further, the 
DoD emphasizes a SoS “consists of parts, relationships, and a whole that is greater than 
the sum of the parts” (Department of Defense, 2004).  
To clarify the hypothesis it is important to define at what echelon the AF assess 
combat readiness/effectiveness.  Further, it is important to define the level of war at 
which forces integrate and combat readiness/effectiveness impact the joint mission.  
Accordingly, this work only examines wing level inspections also known as Unit 
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Effectiveness Inspections (UEI).  UEIs and are designed to assess unit readiness and 
combat capability (Secretary of the Air Force, 2012).  The “iron” or weapon systems 
(aircraft, security forces, Special Operations Forces (SOF), maintenance, etc), which 
provide ACC’s combat capability and deploy in support of joint operations, reside at the 
wing level.  
The operational and tactical levels of warfare are the two levels where the effects 
of weapon systems merge to create synergistic effects.  The third level, not explored, is 
the strategic level of warfare.  The operational level refers to operations conducted among 
units and organizations, the proficiency and interaction of units across organizations, and 
the integration and coupling of capabilities (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011), (Hoing, 2003), 
(Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2003).  The operational level is the level where operations are 
“planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic objectives” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2014).  It bridges the gap between the tactical and strategic levels of warfare (Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, 2014).  The tactical level refers to unit level capabilities, daily proficiency at 
basic skills, and the application of those skills when required (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2011), (Hoing, 2003), (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2003).  It is the level at “which battles and 
engagements are planned and executed” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014) and “focus on the 
ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to 
the enemy to achieve combat objectives” (US Army, 2004). 
These two levels imply a direct connection between individual units and the 
interaction of these forces to achieve specified objectives.  At these levels, units must be 
proficient and practiced in joint operations to ensure success.  The IG’s UEI directly 
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correlates to these two levels of warfare as it seeks to evaluate unit effectiveness and 
combat readiness. 
Finally, this work does not attempt to determine if the recommended changes 
provide a more effective measure of merit.   
Implications 
This work provides a defendable case for changing how the ACC/IG determines 
wing readiness.  Applying a joint SoS architecture to wing readiness inspections has 
applications outside ACC and the AF.  There is a direct application for a similar SoS 
approach to DoD acquisition programs during the developmental test and operational test 
phases of project management.  In addition, other MAJCOMs, service branches, and 
COCOMs may wish to adopt an analogous model to reduce risk and provide a better 
assessment of force readiness within their organizations. 
Preview 
The following chapters examine the above research questions and provide 
sufficient and verifiable evidence to defend the hypothesis.  Chapter 2 provides 
contextual information to support chapters three and four.  It provides a brief history on 
the IG before explaining how the AFIS works.  Chapter 2 also provides historical 
information on the evolution of joint operations and examines how the AF postures its 
forces to meet global taskings.  Chapter 3 explains the case study methodology used to 
answer the proposed research questions.  Chapter 4 analyzes the three case study units of 
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analysis identified in Chapter 3.  Finally, Chapter 5 restates the hypothesis, summarize 
the main research points, and recommends actions and further areas of study.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Chapter Overview 
Chapter 2 provides the necessary background information to support the research 
presented in Chapter 4.  It examines the rules and regulations governing Joint, AF, and 
wing operations.  Further, this section examines the AFIS and how the IG implements the 
AFIS at the wing level.  Chapter 2 also provides information on the history of joint 
warfare and its evolution.  It provides an understanding of the development of JPs and 
how the Air Force postures forces to deploy in response to a Joint Force Commander’s 
(JFCC) request.  In reviewing the history of joint warfare, this chapter shows how 
operations rely on combined effects of joint and coalition capabilities to be successful.  
Additionally analyzing joint operations and AF deployment cycle creates an 
understanding of the joint SoS wings operate within.  Providing this information lays the 
framework for why adopting a joint SoS architecture within the AFIS is necessary to 
effectively evaluate a wing’s combat capability. 
Research Areas and Relevant Research 
Similar Research 
LtCol Jeffrey Hoing, United States Marine Corp (USMC), conducted similar 
research in 2003.  Analogous with this work, LtCol Hoing analyzed the Marine Corps 
Combat Readiness Evaluation System (MCCRES) and Commanding General’s 
Inspection (CGI) programs to determine their effectiveness at measuring Marine Corps 
operational readiness.  At the time, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were exposing 
weaknesses within the services to conduct sustained joint operations.  The Secretary of 
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Defense (SECDEF) and CJCS published guidance to all the service branches 
emphasizing the importance of interoperability, agility, integrated operations, and 
flexibility.  LtCol Hoing examined the MCCRES and CGI programs ability and 
effectiveness to train, test, and measures these joint characteristics within Marine tactical 
aviation units.   
Using joint guidance, LtCol Hoing noted a similarity in the definitions for the 
operational and tactical levels of warfare.  A major point of his research, LtCol Hoing 
separated these two levels, relating the tactical level to single unit or person proficiency 
in basic skills.  His definition for the operational level related to the level at which forces 
or units integrate to form the joint force.  Further, he decoupled the definitions for combat 
readiness and operational readiness.  Combat readiness is tactically focused, were 
operational readiness is the “organization, manning, and training level of a unit that 
allows it to be rapidly deployed, integrated, and immediately employed as part of a joint, 
allied, or coalition force” (Hoing, 2003).  By separating these definitions, he linked 
tactical warfare to combat readiness and operational warfare to operational readiness.  He 
then focused his work on operational readiness concluding that the Marine Corps has a 
fairly robust combat readiness program.  This also aligned his work with the issue 
addressed by the SECDEF and CJCS 
LtCol Hoing examined the evaluation systems of the Navy, AF, Army, and North 
Atlantic Treat Organization (NATO) to determine how these systems capture the 
aforementioned joint characteristics specifically during operation readiness inspections.  
Similar to this work, he concludes that the MCCRES and CGI fail to adequately evaluate 
operational readiness.  He suggests these programs be replaced with evaluation systems 
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that better capture operational skills.  He concluded that the only way to successfully 
elevate marine tactical air to the next level was to adopt a new system with the ability to 
evaluate the effectiveness of units at integrating with other marine and joint 
organizations.  
Contrary to LtCol Hoing’s work, this work does not differentiate between the 
tactical and operational levels, nor combat versus operational readiness.  It is the 
perspective of this work that all these areas are intertwined.  In order to truly adopt a joint 
perspective and to better evaluate joint readiness requires a full change from training up 
to execution.  However, his work is significant in that the general problem statement is a 
substandard evaluation system failing to adequately ensure Marine units are prepared for 
joint operations.  
History of the Inspector General 
The Air Force IG traces its lineage back to the American Army of 1777 and the 
creation of the IG function (Headquarters US Air Force, 2014).  When the AF separated 
from the Army in 1947, a similar oversight organization continued to provide oversight 
on AF aviation activities (Headquarters US Air Force, 2014).  In 1948, General Hoyt S. 
Vandenberg officially established the AF IG function.  General Vandenberg “outlined the 
IG’s mission as:  determining the combat and logistic effectiveness of the Air Force, 
[and] insuring the maintenance of discipline and security” (Headquarters US Air Force, 
2014).  The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 established the AF IG as an independent 
organization reporting to military and civilian leaders (Headquarters US Air Force, 
2014).  A large AF reorganization in 1990 separated the IG’s safety and inspection roles 
into two different organizations.  The result created the Air Force Safety Center and the 
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Air Force Inspection Agency (AFIA) as a component of the AF IG.  AFIA’s mission 
remained strikingly similar to General Vandenberg’s proposed IG, requiring an 
organization to independently assess combat capability (Headquarters US Air Force, 
2014). 
The Air Force Inspection System  
AFI 90-201 and Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 90-2 govern the AFIS.  
AFPD 90-2 acts as the parent document, directing the implementation of an AFIS 
overseen by the IG.  AFI 90-20 carries out the policies outlined in AFPD 90-2.  The 
objective of the AFIS is to assess and report on a unit’s readiness, efficiency, and 
effectiveness to execute its assigned mission(s).  The responsibility of the IG is to 
implement and carry out the AFIS by establishing an inspection program consistent with 
the command’s mission requirements (Secretary of the Air Force, 2012).  AFI 90-201 
specifies the AFIS must link inspection compliance with mission readiness to ensure a 
robust and efficient program.  At the wing level, the AFIS places an emphasis on 
identifying unknown risk and developing mitigation strategies (Secretary of the Air 
Force, 2012). 
To assess and measure a wing’s capability and effectiveness, the IG uses a 
checklist derived from AFIs, DoD instructions, joint publications (JPs), public law, 
Executive Orders (EO), and other regulatory documents (Secretary of the Air Force, 
2012).  The complete list of governing regulations is provided in Appendix A.  Using 
regulatory documents reduces subjectivity and provides a baseline for all wing 
inspections.  AFI 90-201 specifies four Major Graded Areas (MGAs); Managing 
Resources, Leading People, Improving the Unit and Executing the Mission (Secretary of 
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the Air Force, 2012).  Each MGA is comprised of a list of mandatory compliance items 
derived from the documents listed in Appendix A.  The AF identified high-risk items 
within the governing documents and required the MAJCOM/IGs create inspection 
checklists using these items as the minimum requirement (Secretary of the Air Force, 
2012).  Figure 1 shows a model of the MGAs and how they form the core of the AFIS.  In 
addition to the IG checklist, HAF or MAJCOM commanders may identify supplementary 
inspection areas called special interest items (SII).  
 
Figure 1: AFIS Inspection Areas 
A MAJCOM/IG inspection, at the wing level or below, is known as a UEI.  The 
UEI serves two purposes.  First, an UEI validates and verifies a wing commander’s 
inspection program (CCIP) “for accuracy, adequacy and relevance” (Secretary of the Air 
Force, 2012).  Second, an UEI delivers an independent assessment of the wing leadership 
and the unit’s ability to execute its assigned missions (Secretary of the Air Force, 2012).  
UEIs are a continual process designed to help Wing/CC’s monitor their wing’s 
progression over time (Secretary of the Air Force, 2012).  An UEI starts with the self-
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identification of deficiencies and areas of risk by a Wing/CC’s compliance team.  The IG 
periodically samples a wing’s progression to mitigate or correct findings through no 
notice inspections or Management Internal Control Toolset (MICT) reviews.  The cycle 
repeats every 24 to 30 months, coinciding with normal two-year assignment cycle for 
wing commanders, and culminating each time in a capstone event.  The capstone event 
includes onsite interviews, exercises, and inspections by MAJCOM/IG personnel.  At the 
conclusion of a cycle, the MAJCOM/IG authors a report noting a unit’s areas of non-
compliance and assigns a score.  The report is a reflection of leadership, readiness, and a 
wing’s ability to perform its mission(s).  Wing and MAJCOM CCs receive final copies of 
the report. 
The AFIS gives the IG a tool to analyze MAJCOM trends through the 
examination of multiple unit inspections.  A database of final reports provides MAJCOM 
leadership insight into the health and readiness of assigned forces. 
The previous version of AFI 90-201 determined the health and capability of AF 
wings to meet their peacetime and contingency operational requirements through two 
types of inspections:  
1) Unit Compliance Inspections (UCI) focused on a wing’s capability to support 
home station operations and abide by mandatory laws (Secretary of the Air Force, 
2012). 
2) Operational Readiness Inspections (ORI) focused on a wing’s capability to support 
contingency operations.  Phase 1 ORIs examined a wing’s ability to posture their 
personnel and equipment in preparation for supporting contingency operations. Phase 
2 ORIs inspected a wing’s capability to execute and sustain combat operations 
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(Secretary of the Air Force, 2012).  Phase 2 ORIs simulated a wartime environment 
and tested a wing’s capability to operate under the adverse conditions (chemical 
environment, base attacks, jamming, limited resources, high ops tempo, etc). 
The new AFI 90-201 does not mandate ORIs, but still levees similar 
requirements.  The shift reflects the change in AFI 90-201 to focus on leadership, reduce 
inspection time/duration, and saving money.  IG personnel now pre-identify areas to 
inspect prior to arrival by monitoring the unit’s self-inspection program and tracking the 
unit’s progress on resolving prior deficiencies.  The new 90-201 provides the Wing/CC 
the opportunity to determine additional areas he/she deems important and build an 
inspection system around his/her priorities.  Through the development of the CCIP, the 
Wing/CC builds his/her own inspection program using ACC/IG provided checklists as a 
minimum standard.  The role of the AFIS now focuses more on how well the Wing’s IG 
conducts the CCIP.  Documentation from wing inspections is input into the MICT 
database.  The ACC/IG regularly monitors a wing’s processes and procedures through 
MICT.  When the ACC/IG shows up for an inspection, they have already pre-identified 
areas they would like to observe based off on MICT inputs.  Conversely, MICT also 
allows the ACC/IG to identify areas that do not require further inspection.  The ACC/IG 
ensures wings strike a balance between the four major graded areas while also assessing 
how well the commander’s inspection program runs.  
In conversations with the ACC/IG personnel, every unit focuses on the MGA 
labeled “executing the mission” because ultimately at the end of the day that is 
everyone’s foremost duty.  However, the IG added that almost any wing can execute the 
mission if and when necessary, but at a great expense to its personnel and equipment.  
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According to the IG, the remaining three MGAs (Leading People, Managing Resources, 
and Improving the Unit) make wings more efficient and effective at executing the 
mission.  The charge of the ACC/IG is to ensure units develop these efficiencies thereby 
reducing mission risks. 
Air Combat Command  
ACC is one of eight MAJCOMS in the AF, with over 352 total force (TF) units 
(active duty, reserve, and guard) and 135,068 military and civilian members (Air Combat 
Command, 2013) (Hostage, Air Combat Command Key Talking Points, 2014).  
MAJCOMs organize, train, equip, and maintain combat ready forces prepared to conduct 
operations on a moment’s notice (Air Combat Command, 2013).  ACC’s status of forces 
includes 25 different Mission Design Series (MDS) platforms totaling 274 active duty 
aircraft, making ACC the preponderant owner of combat aircraft in the AF (Hostage, Air 
Combat Command Key Talking Points, 2014).  ACC’s list of MDS platforms includes a 
wide variety of fighter, bomber, Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), 
battle management, Command Control and Communication (C3), signals intelligence 
aircraft, and Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) (Air Combat Command, 2013). 
In addition to its function as a MAJCOM, ACC serves as the primary force 
provider to Joint Forces Command (JFC).  In this capacity, ACC responds “to the 
combatant commander’s request for conventional forces with a mission ready joint 
solution” (U.S. Joint Forces Command).  Additionally, ACC must monitor the health of 
AF forces to sustain current operational commitments while ensuring future forces are 
properly trained, equipped, and combat ready (U.S. Joint Forces Command). 
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ACC also acts as the Core Function Lead Integrator (CFLI) for five of the twelve 
Service Core Functions (SCFs) assigned by the SECDEF.  The twelve core functions 
encompass the full range of AF capabilities. Sustaining and building the SCFs ensures the 
AF can provide full combat support to the Joint Force. Table 1 lists the twelve core 
functions and the responsible CFLI.  The CFLI’s role is to ensure near term and future 
planning, development, and sustainment of these capabilities to “help the AF achieve the 
strategic and operational objectives of the National Defense Strategy” (Barnhart).  In this 
capacity, the CFLI also acts as the AF internal integrator of requirements across the 
MAJCOMs and is tasked with reducing near and long-range program risk to achieve 
SECDEF guidance and direction (Barnhart) (Hostage, 2012). 
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Table 1:  Air Force Service Core Functions (Barnhart) 
Service Core Functions  Core Function Lead Integrator 
Air Superiority  Air Combat Command 
Global Precision Attack  Air Combat Command 
Global Integrated ISR  Air Combat Command 
Command and Control  Air Combat Command 
Personal Recovery  Air Combat Command 
Building Partnerships  Air Education and Training Command 
Nuclear Deterrence Ops  Air Force Global Strike Command 
Agile Combat Support  Air Force Material Command 
Space Superiority  Air Force Space Command 
Cyberspace Superiority  Air Force Space Command 
Special Operations  Air Force Special Operations Command 
Rapid Global Mobility  Air Mobility Command 
 
Joint Operational Architecture 
History of Joint Operations 
US joint operations trace their beginning to the Revolutionary War when a small 
Continental Army and Navy working in conjunction with French naval and ground forces 
to defeated the British.  In the final battle of the Revolutionary War, General Cornwallis 
surrendered to General George Washington at the port city of Yorktown, Virginia.  
Simultaneously leveraging the effects of naval and land forces, General Washington 
surrounded General Cornwallis’s army, cutting off resupply and reinforcements.  While 
the small US Navy blocked the channel from British ships and pounded the coast with 
artillery, the Continental Army enveloped General Cornwallis’ forces from the land.  This 
first instance of joint planning and execution highlights the potential force multiplication 
created by combining two independent systems. 
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Prior to the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, the 
US military operated as three separate branches.  Peacetime operations of organizing, 
training, equipping, and planning were conducted independently (Locker, 2001).  
Military operations were planned and executed separately and operational control of 
forces remained with each service (Fogarty, 2006).  Service CCs often failed to 
communicate or coordinate efforts.  The Korean, Vietnam, and Grenada conflicts 
highlighted these flaws.  Lacking integration, each branch executed the war according to 
its own objectives and strategies (Fogarty, 2006).  Studies of these operations revealed 
communication issues, uncoordinated tactical operations, failed liaison programs, and 
separately coordinated operations (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013).  
Goldwater and Nichols also cited the military’s lack of integration and inability to profit 
from economies of scale as major reasons for past failures.  Further, separate command 
structures hindered the development of joint doctrine (Locker, 2001). 
The Goldwater-Nichols Act reorganized the military command structure, 
formalizing the need to deploy and operate as a single unified force.  The Goldwater-
Nichols Act established operational control of deployed forces under a single combatant 
commander (Senate Committee on Armed Services, 1985).  Service chiefs were cut out 
of the operational chain of command and assigned the primary role of organizing, 
training, and equipping forces in support of combatant commander requirements (United 
States Congress, 1986).  The Goldwater Nichols Act created a joint SoS architecture 
unified under the COCOMs.  COCOMs assign a single or multiple JFCCs to lead 
operations within their geographic area of responsibility.  JFCCs continuously modify 
their joint organization throughout operations to provide the right mixes of forces and 
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equipment to achieve mission success (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007).  Operation Just 
Cause, the first Gulf War, Bosnia, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) (also known as 
Operation New Dawn) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) have tested the JFC 
construct. According to JP-1 the JFCC’s role is to create unity of effort and unified action 
among participating organizations (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013).   
Joint Publications 
JPs are standing documents, written and approved by the COCOMs, service 
branches, and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).  JPs were created to provide guidance on the 
employment of joint forces.  The primary purpose for creating JPs was to establish unity 
of command and unity of effort during joint operations (Furr, 1991).  Prior to 1986, the 
development of joint doctrine was hindered by a lack of clear guidance determining who 
was responsible for creating and enforcing doctrine.  In addition, COCOMs were not 
required to participate and service branches were not obligated to follow joint policy 
(Furr, 1991).  Service components were responsible for developing their own operational 
doctrine “with provision for coordination between services” (Cushman, 1985).  A 1985 
Senate Armed Services Committee report identified “poorly developed joint doctrine as 
one of the major systems of inadequate unified military advice” (Furr, 1991).  Further, 
the report stated, “the joint operational effectiveness of military forces is dependent upon 
the development of joint doctrine and sufficient joint training to be able to effectively 
employ it” (Senate Committee on Armed Services, 1985).  The Goldwater-Nichols Act 
empowered the CJCS and assigned the chairman full responsibility for the development 
and establishment of joint doctrine.  The Act required all services to comply with joint 
publications (Furr, 1991). 
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In this regard, JP-1 continues to echo the words of the Goldwater-Nichols Act 
stating “successful joint operations merge capabilities and skill sets of assigned service 
components. Interoperability and effective integration of service capabilities enhance 
joint operations to accomplish US Government objective(s)” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2013).  Today, AFIs provide additional guidance on how AF units will implement JP 
procedures. 
Unit Mission Development 
In planning for deployments, wings train and prepare to execute their assigned 
missions.  Wings must also maintain the proper mix of equipment to support necessary to 
support their assigned missions.  A wings’s weapon system determines the types of 
missions it can accomplish (a weapon system can be an aircraft or job function).  A Joint 
Staff supporting a COCOM determines the missions and equipment necessary to achieve 
the COCOMs goals.  The Joint Operational Planning Process and Global Force 
Management Process are two documents used to link missions to specific wings as well 
as assign and set time-tables for the movement of forces should they be required. 
Mission development is a joint function that begins with the President approving 
and publishing the National Security Strategy (NSS) and Unified Command Plan (UCP).  
These documents provide the US’s strategic outlook and establish the responsibilities and 
roles of the COCOMs respectively (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011) (Joint Staff-7, 2011) 
(Santacrose, 2011).  The SECDEF uses the NSS to establish DoD “policy goals and 
priorities for the development, employment, and sustainment of forces” (Santacrose, 
2011).  The National Defense Strategy (NDS) is the venue through which the SECDEF 
presents his/her priorities.  Further, the SECDEF authors the Guidance for Employment of 
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the Force (GEF) which “consolidates and integrates five separate guidance documents 
into a single strategic directive” providing “clearer linkages from strategy to 
operations/activities” (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011) (Santacrose, 2011).  
Contained within the GEF is guidance on campaign planning, a major part of how units 
receive their mission (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011). 
The CJCS outlines the global military strategy and strategic direction in the NMS 
document, using the NDS, NSS, and GEF as a framework.  The NDS, NSS, and GEF 
“provide ‘the what,’ and the NMS provides the ‘how’ in aligning ends, ways, means, and 
risk to accomplish the missions called for in support of U.S. national interests and 
objectives” (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008).  In addition, the CJCS helps 
author the UCP.  The UCP contains the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS).  The 
JSPS tasks the COCOMs to create their Campaign Plans.  Campaign Plans establish the 
COCOMs end state and steady state vision for their area of responsibility.  Campaign 
Plans include force posture, security requirements, alliances, and goals (Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011) (Santacrose, 2011).  Figure 2 depicts a graphical 
representation detailing the steps required to create a Campaign Plan.  
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Figure 2: Joint planning and development process (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011) 
Operational Plans (OPLAN) and Contingency Plans (CONPLAN) are two subsets 
of the larger Campaign Plan (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011).  They are pre-developed 
military plans created to respond to potential threats and regional instability.  These plans 
present COCOMs with quick options for returning to a steady state and are anticipatory 
in nature.  Each OPLAN and CONPLAN contains the COCOM’s force and equipment 
requirements to achieve his or her desired end state.  OPLANs and CONPLANs also 
contain Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011).  
The TPFDD includes information on when and where personnel and cargo will begin 
loading, as well as guidance on the rotation of forces and equipment into and out of 
theater (Newberry, 2005).  Joint planners match service capabilities to these requirements 
and link specific units, functions, and equipment to each plan.  
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Units in ACC use their assigned OPLANs and CONPLANs for training and 
exercise development.  OPLANs and CONPLANs list specific mission sets, equipment, 
personnel required, and deployment and phasing information for each plan.  OPLANs 
and CONPLANs also contain the operational and tactical level objectives and how these 
objectives will be achieved through the integrated use of all service components (Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2011) (Newberry, 2005). 
Air Force Deployment Process 
Before 1990, AF units were tasked independent of each other and under multiple 
commands, causing inconsistent deployment tempos and incomplete force packages 
(Ross, 2012).  In addition, assets deployed under multiple commanders caused competing 
requirements.  The Air and Space Expeditionary Force (AEF) concept, created in the 
1990s, logically organized AF assets into 10 force packages (McCullough, 2012).  Force 
packages paired component capabilities together, ensuring the effective utilization and 
blend of assets required to complete the assigned mission.  The AEF concept also 
provided a stable and predictable deployment tempo for airmen (Secretary of the Air 
Force, 2012).  The 10 force packages deployed under the Air and Space Expeditionary 
Task Force (AETF) construct.  The “AETF presents a JFCC with a task-organized, 
integrated package with the appropriate balance of force, sustainment, control, and force 
protection,” scalable to meet changing COCOM requirements and mission sets (United 
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States Air Force, 2011).  Equipment and personnel were assigned a unit type code (UTC) 
which designated a specific capability.  Force packages are comprised of UTCs 
depending on the capabilities required3.  Two force packages were always postured to 
deploy while the remaining eight packages were in other stages of equipping/revitalizing, 
training, preparing, or returning from deployment.  Figure 3 shows the cycle of training, 
preparing, deploying, and reintegration every force package went through.  Prior to OIF 
and OEF, the AEF concept fit well with the joint vision of rapid deployment and 
integration.  
 
Figure 3:  AEF concept prior to surges in OEF and OIF 
 
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan however, stressed the AEF construct.  The 
original AEF concept was not designed to provide a long-term surge capability.  To 
quickly adapt, the AF converted to a tempo band system and dissolved the force package 
                                                
 
 
 
3 Force packages are often referred to as “Buckets”.  Two force packages filled one of five 
buckets. 
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concept.  The tempo band system placed UTCs into one of five active duty tempo bands4.  
The five tempo bands each had a different deploy-to-dwell ratio “based on the combatant 
commander’s requirements” for that specific function (McCullough, 2012).  Since UTCs 
are capability based, the tempo band system created a situation where a single airman 
could deploy.  Individual augmentees often deployed in support of joint or coalition units, 
filling a specific function (Ross, 2012). 
 
Figure 4:  AEF Tempo Band Construct 
 
The next evolution of the AF deployment process is called AEF Next.  It rebuilds 
the old AEF process while addressing issues concerning surge capability, force 
                                                
 
 
 
4 Reserve and Guard units follow their own specific tempo band construct due to differences in 
Title 10 and Title 32 authorities (Figure 4) (Kapp & Torreon, 2013).   
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packaging, teaming, and synchronization with Guard and Reserve forces.  AEF Next 
creates six air power teams based on the AF core functions.  Each team includes all the 
required units to satisfy that AF core function. Air power teams will be similar to Brigade 
Combat Teams (BCT) or Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) and thus easier to present 
to JFCCs (Ross, 2012). Team integration is a big part of AEF Next and is designed to 
allow air power teams to train and exercise together (McCullough, 2012) (Williams, 
2013).  Wings will now deploy as a complete package instead of a collection of 
individual augmentees. 
Summary 
Chapter 2 presented the contextual information relevant to framing the main 
hypothesis.  Chapter 2 identified how the current AFIS system works and defined its 
main goals:  ensuring mission readiness and reducing risk.  It also presented a logical 
case for defining joint operations as a SoS and demonstrated how the AF already operates 
within the SoS.  Further, chapter 2 showed how the AF mission is focused on the success 
of joint operations and ensuring integration and interoperability within the Joint SoS.  It 
presented several documents showing on the military’s evolution and how current 
strategic level planning documents depict a future joint force more integrated and reliant 
upon each other.  Interoperability and flexibility will be attributes of this future force. 
These conclusions carry forward into Chapters 3 and 4 helping provide background data 
supporting the Units of Analysis (UOA) and solidifying the thesis position of overlaying 
a joint SoS within the AFIS. 
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III.  Methodology 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter focuses on the methodology used to answer the research question: 
How should the AFIS be improved to account for the integrated nature of military 
warfare reflective of a System-of-Systems architecture? 
This question is answered in the following sections using a case study method.  
Three embedded units of analysis help answer the main research question.  UOA one 
focuses on the integrative nature of military assets during combat operations and the risks 
associated with joint operations.  UOA two examines potential SoS metrics/attributes for 
assessing joint readiness and how these can be applied within the current AFIS.  UOA 
three presents limitations or counter arguments to implementing joint SoS attributes into 
the AFIS. 
Figure 5 shows a representative diagram of the project’s design layout.  The 
dotted line represents the blurred boundary between context and the case study.  This 
distinction highlights the important role context plays in framing the case study.  Case 
studies focus on the operational links between events by connecting empirical and 
contextual data to the main study question.  The three UOAs and the main research 
question embedded within the larger context box depicts this relationship. 
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Figure 5:  Case Study Design 
Research Method Selection 
According to Robert Yin, there are five methods from which to choose from when 
conducting research (2012).  Selecting the appropriate method aids in the development of 
a research plan (Yin, 2009).  Table 2 shows three conditions helpful in determining which 
method to select.  
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Table 2:  Relevant Situations for Different Research Methods (Yin, 2009) 
          Condition    
                  
Method 
Form of 
Research 
Question 
Requires Control 
of Behavioral 
Events 
Focuses on 
Contemporary 
Events 
Experiment How, why Yes Yes 
Survey 
Who, What, 
Where, How 
many, How much 
No Yes 
Archival 
Analysis 
Who, What, 
Where, How 
many, How much 
No Yes/No 
History How, Why No No 
Case Study How, Why No Yes 
 
A case study research paper presents the strongest method for three reasons.  
First, the main research and investigative questions are “how” and “why” questions.  
Second, the author cannot control the behavior of the AFIS.  Third, the thesis focuses on 
current events.  Another reason for using the case study research method is when  the 
links between supporting data and the main study questions are too complex to capture in 
surveys or controlled experiments.  Robert Yin explains, “You use the case study method 
because you wanted to understand a real-life phenomenon in depth, but such 
understanding encompassed important contextual conditions – because they were highly 
pertinent to your phenomenon of study” (2009). 
Unit of Analysis Examination 
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This thesis has three embedded UOAs as depicted in Figure 5.  Each UOA is its 
own case study and thus may use any or a combination of the five research methods 
presented in Table 2 (Yin, 2012).  This is a key principle of case study research, helping 
create a larger pool of corroborative data, collected from multiple sources, converging on 
ideas or facts that directly support the main hypothesis (Yin, 2009).  A large triangulating 
pool of data helps solidify the research, validates the hypothesis, and dispels one of the 
leading prejudices against case study research; lack of academic rigor (Yin, 2009).  
Figure 6 provides a pictorial diagram of convergent data and also reflects how each UOA 
acts as its own case study. 
 
Figure 6:  Convergent analysis validates research hypothesis 
Unit of Analysis 1 – Integrative Nature of Joint Military Systems 
UOA 1:  The integrative nature of military assets during combat operations and 
the risks associated with joint operations. 
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UOA 1 focuses on four of the investigative questions: 
1. How does the Air Force align/posture forces for joint operations? 
2. What is the focus of the current ACC/IG Inspection system? 
3. How does the current inspection system account for the integrated nature of 
military assets during operations? 
4. What system-of-systems examples or incidents exist that have a direct relation 
to an operational readiness inspection? 
Chapter 4 presents observations from joint operations and large force exercises.  
These observations, along with context from joint planning documents, will frame US 
military operations as joint in nature, reliant on the synergistic effects of the service 
branches to wage and win wars.  High-level strategic documents also emphasize the need 
for joint operations to become even more integrated in the future.  The trend toward 
further integration creates areas of additional risk.  These areas must be addressed now in 
preparation for the future.  Current AFIS evaluations should frame inspections within the 
joint SoS in order to identify and reduce integration-associated risks. This UOA will 
blend case study and archival methods.   
Unit of Analysis 2 – Joint Readiness Assessment and Metrics 
UOA 2:  Potential system of systems metrics/attributes for assessing joint 
readiness and how these can be applied within the context of the AFIS.   
UOA 2 focuses on analyzing two of five investigative questions: 
1. What system-of-systems examples or incidents exist that have a direct relation 
to an operational readiness inspection? 
2. What system-of-systems metrics or attributes can be used to evaluate and 
determine the status and health of ACC units? 
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This UOA examines ways to apply the AFIS to preexisting resources and 
environments better representative of the Joint SoS.  UOA 2 also studies several 
metrics/attributes inherent in joint operations, which should be added to the AFIS 
checklists.  Primarily a case study, UOA 2 addresses how and why these additions/ 
modifications are necessary and what they provide.  This UOA demonstrates how 
realigning the AFIS provides better evidence of a unit’s combat readiness.   
Unit of Analysis 3 – Limitation of the SoS approach 
UOA 3:  Limitations or counter arguments to implementing joint SoS attributes 
into the AFIS. 
This UOA focuses on identifying areas of concern regarding implementing a joint 
SoS architecture.  As such, UOA 3 helps answer three of the investigative questions. 
1. What is the focus of the current ACC/IG Inspection system? 
2. How does the current inspection system account for the integrated nature of 
military assets during operations? 
3. What system-of-systems examples or incidents exist that have a direct relation 
to an operational readiness inspection? 
According to Yin, identifying and acknowledging weaknesses or differencing 
opinions are an essential part of case study research, providing the author an opportunity 
to refute each case.  Counter arguments for each of these concerns are also addressed in 
UOA 3. 
Sources 
The concept of applying a joint SoS architecture to the AFIS finds support in 
academia, national strategy documents, and the DoD.  However, to fully support the 
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academic resources and defend the hypothesis required input and feedback from Subject 
Matter Experts (SMEs).  Their insights provided further areas to research as well as 
provided critical analysis on the applicability and necessity for implementing a change 
gained over their AF careers.  SMEs ranged from personnel on the ACC staff, primarily 
within the A2 and A3 directorates, with over 20 years of experience including 
assignments as group and wing CCs.  Deputy Directors, SESs, division chiefs, branch 
chiefs, and other staff personnel with direct experience interacting with wing personnel as 
well as past assignments at wing, group, and squadron levels also contributed inputs.  
Members of the ACC/IG also reviewed and provided thoughts and comments on this 
work.  Several members of the ACC staff had past joint experiences, either from staff 
assignments or deployments.  Wing/CC’s from multiple bases contributed thoughts and 
ideas as well.  Engagements with O-3s to O-5s, from multiple Air Force Specialty Codes 
(AFSC), across ACC, Air Force Material Command (AFMC), Air Mobility Command 
(AMC), AF Special Operations Command (AFSOC), and US AF Europe (USAFE), 
added perspectives from those currently implementing the AFIS and CCIPs.  This diverse 
field of SMEs totaling approximately 100 personnel lends credibility to this research. 
Summary 
Chapter 3 presented a road map for answering the hypothesis using a case study 
methodology.  It described the techniques for analyzing each UOA and what 
methodology will be used.  Chapter 4 presents the analysis and results of these three 
UOAs. 
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IV. Analysis and Results  
Chapter Overview 
Chapter 4 explores each UOA in greater depth providing examples and dialogue 
to support the hypothesis.  Chapter 4 is divided into three sections based on the UOAs.  
Section one describes critical weaknesses in how the AFIS evaluates wing readiness in a 
joint context.  Section two investigates ways to enhance the AFIS using joint 
characteristics.  Section two also covers current resources available to help implement a 
joint SoS within the AFIS.  Section three addresses opposing viewpoints or flaws in 
implementing a joint SoS inspection. 
Findings:  Unit of Analysis 1 – Integrative Nature of Joint Military Systems 
Since the colonial campaigns of 1776 leading up to 1986, all US military 
operations attempted to achieve a successful joint force. In 1986, as a result of failed 
military operations from 1950 to 1983, Congress ordered sweeping organizational and 
climate changes across the DoD.  The Goldwater Nichols Act transformed the DoD, 
acknowledging that successful operations required the synchronized and combined 
effects of all military departments working as single force.  The acts two primary changes 
established the IG as an independent evaluator and organized the war fighting chain of 
command under a single unified CC. 
JP 1-02 defines interoperability as “the ability to operate in synergy in the 
execution of assigned tasks” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014).  In 2008, JP 1-02 defined 
interoperability as “the ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept 
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services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable 
them to operate effectively together” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008).  This later definition 
more precisely defines interoperability as an exchange between entities to increase 
efficiencies and implies a level of integration.  General Martin Dempsey recently stated 
US armed forces continue to make substantial improvements in their ability to conduct 
joint operations; however, he noted two areas of concerns.  First, he stated US forces 
must continue to work together to advance joint capabilities, as future conflicts will 
require further integration to achieve success.  Second, “each [speaking of Operations 
Desert Storm, OEF, and OIF] has further highlighted requirements for a system to 
effectively measure, assess, and report readiness from a joint perspective” (Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013).  General Dempsey’s words reemphasize the hypothesis; 
specifically, that combat readiness should be assessed inside the joint SoS architecture. 
Air Combat Command Staff Perspectives 
Figure 7 depicts an illustrative joint operations OV-1 diagram.  The picture shows 
the integrated and reliant nature of service components in an operational environment.  It 
displays multiple levels of interoperability creating the synergistic effects referred to by 
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the CJCS.  Discussions with ACC staff personnel5 helped identify key differences 
between joint warfare, as depicted in Figure 7 and a single wing inspection system. 
 
Figure 7:  Operation view of the joint environment (SAF/CIO A6, 2010) 
A primary aspect unique to joint operations is the sharing of information across 
platforms and services.  This crucial element of modern warfare helps find, locate, and 
exploit enemy weaknesses.  Information sharing drives the development of future 
operational and tactical level missions and decision planning as well as builds a common 
                                                
 
 
 
5 ACC Staff personnel refers to member of the ACC/A2 and A3 staffs, including Branch Chiefs, 
Division Chiefs, SESs, and Directors of Operations. 
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operating picture for all users and enhances situational awareness.  Additionally, 
information sharing requires three primary elements. 
1)  The gathering equipment must be able to send the data. 
2)  The receiving equipment must be able to accept and process the information. 
3)  The users on both ends must know what to do with the information. 
Missing any one of these elements degrades the utility of the information.  In joint 
operations, information is everywhere.  Finding the right information and passing it along 
to the correct user(s) are important functions of all deployed personnel. 
The characteristics of joint leadership, timing, and weapon system relationships 
are also demonstrated in Figure 7.  Based on the number of connections between 
platforms, leaders must understand their role in the grand scheme as well as other 
responsibilities they may assume.  Leaders must also be aware of which organizations are 
depending on them to successful complete their assigned mission.  According to ACC 
staff, the diagram also reveals the amount of risk leaders assume when it comes to 
implementing the mission and assigning personnel and equipment.  They must constantly 
balance the safety and security of their personnel and equipment versus the requirements 
to complete the mission.  Leadership characteristics at this level are difficult to assess 
outside the joint SoS. 
ACC staff personnel commented that organization provides a level of structure by 
establishing a chain of command.  Creating a well-organized operation ensures 
information flows smoothly and helps personnel build and maintain situational 
awareness.  Joint operations, because of the mix of services, coalition partners, and 
outside agencies, present a larger organizational problem.  CCs must decipher these 
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larger often overlapping organizational rings within joint operations to ensure the timely 
dissemination of information to the right personnel.  Conversely, the organizational 
structure within most ACC wings is simpler in size, scope, and geography. 
The relationship between weapon systems deals with the role of supporting versus 
supported.  In joint operations personnel must know not only their platform’s capabilities 
and limitations but also those of other platforms involved.  The relationship between 
platforms explains who is leading the operation and the operation’s primary goal.  
Understanding these connections contributes to mission success. 
 All these elements (information sharing, leadership, organization, and weapon 
system relationships) are linked together in the joint environment and their effects are 
often compounded by distance.  In a joint environment a Wing/CC must juggle all these 
elements simultaneously.  It is difficult to evaluate these elements during single wing 
inspection as they are often mitigated, simulated, or not applied. 
ACC staff members pointed out there is no standard for joint preparation or joint 
integration.  While joint publications and AFIs provide guidance and direction, there 
remains room for interpretation.  There is a lack of clear guidance on what joint means at 
the wing level and who monitors adherence to JPs.  They readily identified a lack of joint 
training opportunities, command level guidance, and oversight to help mitigate this 
problem.  Compounding this issue, staff members mentioned every Wing/CC organizes 
and trains his/her unit based on past experiences.  These unique career experiences create 
different interpretations of already loosely defined regulations directing affecting how 
wings practice, prepare, and equip.  Compounded just across AF wings, these differences 
create integration issues during joint operations. 
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The ACC staff provided several notable differences in how a single wing OV-1 
looks versus the joint operational OV-1 depicted in Figure 7.  A wing level inspection 
under evaluates, or neglects several of the previously mentioned joint characteristics.  
Wing level inspections are introspective, focusing on areas within the Wing/CC’s 
purview.  Wing exercises and inspections often simulate outside relationships.  
Communication and information flow is much shorter and does not feed a larger 
organization.  The negative implications of missed communications, actions, or plans do 
not ripple outward.  Further, there is not a leadership role to practice mitigating these 
implications.  During wing evaluations, distance also does not become factor.  Everything 
necessary to complete their mission, the wing has at their disposal.  There are limited 
ways to test interoperability and integration during wing exercises.  Reliance on others is 
reduced and thus the pressures to perform, act, or accept risks are not present.   
Risk Analysis:  The Diamond Model 
The previous discussions with ACC staff members highlights several differences 
between joint operations and single wing inspections.  These differences present known 
levels of risks.  Modifying an approach designed to assess project management risk 
provides insight into the differences between joint operations and single wing 
inspections.  The diamond model approach created by Shenhar and Dvir helps managers 
scope their project and select the appropriate managerial techniques to maximize benefits 
and reduce risk (2007).  Analysis occurs using a radar chart with four dimensions.  
Linking the plotted values from each dimension creates a graphical representation of the 
uncertainty and risk inherent in a project.  See Figure 8 through Figure 10 for examples.  
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The four dimensions are listed in Table 3 along with abbreviated definitions (Shenhar & 
Dvir, 2007).  Appendix B provides additional information on the diamond technique. 
Table 3:  Diamond Method dimensions and definitions 
Dimension Novelty Technology Complexity Pace 
Definition 
How new is the 
product, 
familiarity with 
the product.  
Represents the 
uncertainty of 
the projects goal 
Technology and 
task uncertainty.  
The level of 
technology 
needed or used 
in the project 
Scope.  Project 
organization.  
What is the 
project task   
Urgency, 
impacts 
autonomy, 
decision 
making, and 
management 
involvement.  
Affects planning 
 
While not specifically designed to identify risks associated with military 
operations, Shenhar and Dvir’s approach to analyzing project management risk is 
applicable to this study.  In fact, military operations contain similar attributes to projects. 
In addition, military operations are planned and coordinated in a comparable fashion to 
tangible project development.  A JFC acts as the project lead, assembling the required 
parts, pieces, and people to complete the mission.  The JFC balances requirements, time, 
sizing, costs, and integration like any project manager.  In this analogy, the operation is 
the project.  Once complete, the JFC is tasked with another project.  Operations, like 
projects, can affect, influence, or run in parallel with other operations and require 
additional oversight to resolve disputes and set priorities.  In the case of military 
operations, the COCOM, SECDEF, and POTUS act as chief executive officers 
delineating responsibilities and managing the oversight of all operations. The DoD’s use 
of the terminology “systems of systems” in reference to the military implies a project like 
structure (ODUSD(A&T)SSE, 2008).  Similar to integration and interoperability issues 
during joint operations hinders mission success, Shenhar and Dvir write that a “complex 
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system does not simply function as a collection of subsystems…even when all 
subsystems function perfectly and each one fully meets specifications, when they are put 
together they rarely work as a system the first time.  Ignoring this reality may cause 
delays and surprises to project managers” (2007).  The similarities between military 
operations management and project management allow the application of Shenhar and 
Dvir’s diamond approach to military operations. 
The next paragraphs provide further discussion on the four dimensions listed in 
Table 3 and offer examples to illustrate each one. 
Novelty relates to the type of military operation as defined by JP 3-0.  This 
dimension also includes geographical location and level of warfare, with the later 
referring to the type of environment faced by our forces.  This includes permissive, non-
permissive, anti-access, aerial denial, and chemical environments.  These factors change 
the operations novelty as they represent environments US forces do not routinely prepare 
for.  The Counter Insurgency (COIN) operations of OEF and OIF, for example, would 
represent a breakthrough level of novelty form of warfare for US forces.  Prior to OEF 
and OIF, the US military had not participated in or practiced a “hearts and minds” 
approach to COIN operations.  This new COIN approach emphasized winning over the 
population as a way to drive out terrorist and reduce insurgent activity. 
Table 4:  Types of Military Operations (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011) 
Examples of Military Operations 
Stability operations Recovery Combating weapons of mass destruction 
Counterdrug 
operations 
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Civil support Noncombatant evacuation 
Chemical, biological, 
radiological, and 
nuclear consequence 
management 
Combating terrorism 
Foreign 
humanitarian 
assistance 
Peace Operations Foreign internal defense Homeland defense 
 
Technology relates to the type of equipment being used in support of the 
operation.  This dimension includes the communication, space, and cyber architecture as 
well as conventional equipment (planes, tanks, bombs).  The OV-1 diagram depicted in 
Figure 7 shows the complex technology required to ensure all forces can communicate 
and complete their assigned missions.  A surgical SEAL operation however, may use less 
technology to control emissions and allow for speed, security, and stealth (Carney & 
Schemmer, 2002). 
Complexity focuses on the operations size, strategy, scope, and command 
architecture.  It also includes components of distance and logistical support.  Coalition 
warfare increases the level of complexity. 
Pace refers to speed and duration and is driven by the type of operation.  Most 
military operations require timely movements in order to meet TPFDD deployment 
timelines or execute a new Air Tasking Order (ATO) cycle.  A humanitarian operation 
may require the rapid deployment of forces, whereas the buildup for Operation Desert 
Storm was deliberate and occurred over a six-month span. The unit’s primary mission 
capability also dictates pace.  Personnel recovery (PR) units may exercise at a blitz pace 
in order to save lives.  Fighter operations however, may fall more in the fast/competitive 
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lane for regular ATO execution but spike to time critical or blitz if called to support a 
Troops-in-Contact (TIC) or PR event. 
The subsequent paragraphs apply the diamond approach to single wing exercises 
and joint operations.  According to the AFI 90-201, inspection readiness reflects mission 
readiness.  If true, the wing and joint diamonds should be relatively similar in size.  
Shenhar and Dvir state inaccurately sizing a project’s diamond indicates a lack of project 
understanding/analysis.  This causes waste, if sized too large, or increased risk, delays, 
and cost, if undersized (Shenhar & Dvir, 2007).  The diamond’s area reflects the project’s 
overall risk and complexity (Shenhar & Dvir, 2007).  The difference in area between the 
wing and joint diamonds reflects the additional complexity inherent in joint operations, 
not captured in wing level exercises.  The size difference translates to additional risk 
wings may face when deploying in support of joint operations.  The resulting diamonds 
were sized by the author using his military experiences as a project manager for 
acquisition programs, multiple deployments as an intelligence officer and civil engineer, 
time in wing level intelligence organizations, and the flight commander for ACC’s Staff 
Assistance Visit (SAV) program.  In addition, the experiences and knowledge of ACC 
personnel, listed in the Sources section, contributed to how to plot each diamond. 
Application of the Diamond Model to a Wing Exercise 
Figure 8 depicts the risk associated with a wing level inspection or exercise.  
Since the majority of wing level exercises are internally focused, the novelty can be 
considered derivative in nature.  Wing level exercises are often derivatives of prior 
exercises with updated intelligence, geopolitical, and TTP information.  Completely new 
exercises scenarios are rarely generated at the wing level.  Given the number of base 
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organizations involved in these exercises the complexity level fits the description of a 
system.  Routinely scenarios become focused on specific functions within the wing, 
limiting base involvement to as few units as necessary.  This minimization, along with 
the repetitive use of similar scenarios, limits the size of the complexity and novelty 
dimensions.  Technology risk remains at the low to medium level. 
 
Figure 8:  Wing level risk assessment 
While several wing organizations work together creating a larger pool of technology 
required to synchronize communications and share data, there is rarely new technology 
integrated into wing scenarios.  Wing scenarios look to refine already existing 
capabilities and identify inefficiencies.  However, it is possible for newer technology to 
be incorporated to correct past deficiencies, which is captured in the slight increase 
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towards medium technology.  In addition, the platform itself affects the size of the 
technology dimension.  ISR platforms, for example, often require larger communications 
networks.  Wing exercises often limit the network requirement though, simulating 
communication and information sharing with outside organizations.  Pace is the only 
dimension identical between wing and joint operations. 
Application of the Diamond Model to joint operations 
Figure 9 shows a diamond model assessment of a joint operation or exercise.  
Joint operations stretch outward in three of the four dimensions compared to a single 
wing inspection. Figure 10 in the next section shows a comparison of the single wing 
versus joint diamonds, overlaying the one over top the other. 
 
49 
 
 
Figure 9:  Joint risk assessment 
Analyzing the novelty dimension for joint operations creates an area between 
platform and breakthrough.  At a minimum, joint operations start at the platform level.  
As discussed in chapter two, JFCs build and tailor forces to meet current operational 
needs.  Each JFC acts as a new platform.   However, the changing global environment, 
rising global powers, the rapid proliferation of technology, advanced Surface to Air 
Missiles (SAMs) and jammers, and the increasing number of terrorist organizations, 
creates an endless number of scenarios joint forces must be prepared to handle.  Future 
operations will challenge US forces in new ways.  The unknown nature of the next 
conflict extends the novelty dimension out to breakthrough.  Joint exercises are often 
conducted at the platform level, expanding upon already used exercises to incorporate 
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new weapon systems or expand the focus of the exercise to incorporate new threat 
environments. 
The technology risk associated with joint operations ranges from high tech to 
super high tech.  The integration of service and/or coalition technology resembles the 
definition of high tech and sets the minimum level of risk.  The “fog and friction” of 
warfare accounts for the increase from high to super-high-tech.  Integration and 
interoperability issues may drive the development of new technology or require the quick 
adaptation of existing technology.  In addition, warfare is the struggle between 
adversaries to achieve conflicting goals.  The struggle to gain and maintain momentum, 
exploit an opponent’s weaknesses, and defend ones gains, spurs the development of new 
technology and TTPs in order to gain a slight advantage.  The rapid development of 
networked and layered sensor and communication systems transformed OEF and OIF 
into super high tech wars. 
The complexity risk associated with joint operations primarily resides at the array 
level.  Shenhar and Dvir define an array as a SoS or “a widely dispersed collection of 
systems that function together to achieve a common purpose” (2007).  This definition is 
exactly how joint and coalition forces operate.  The challenge of merging and organizing 
several command structures under one unified CC poses a large risk.  Several other 
factors affect complexity risk.  Ensuring all services work to achieve a single goal, 
balancing various Rules of Engagements (ROEs), understanding the strengths and 
limitations of each service or coalition partner, and managing a global logistics chain are 
a few examples. 
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Comparison of Wing and Joint risks 
Figure 10 shows the joint and wing diamonds plotted on the same graph.  Joint 
operations incorporate a larger amount of risk in three of the four dimensions.  Only the 
pace dimension is the same for joint and wing operations.  The added area of the joint 
diamond represents shortfalls and unidentified risks in single wing inspections.  The 
smaller wing diamond explains the “start-up pains” and additional issues several ACC 
staff and wing personnel mentioned earlier.  A puzzle analogy works well to describe the 
differences.  The POTUS has a vision, which the SECDEF in turn creates into a picture.  
The COCOMs cuts up the puzzle as they see fit with a single piece representing a wing.  
People only put puzzles together when they want to.  No one counts the pieces or sorts 
them before starting.  It’s halfway through the puzzle when someone realizes pieces are 
missing, finds pieces from another puzzle, or notices the pieces don’t fit together 
anymore.  The combined effect of all the pieces is a perfect recreation of the POTUS’s 
vision.  Missing just one-piece flaws the entire image.   
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Figure 10:  Overlay of Joint and Single Wing risk assessment models 
ACC staff also equated the size difference between the joint and single wing 
diamonds to the introverted nature of wings.  When at home station, wings tend to focus 
on improving internal functions and procedures.  Their training focuses on the specific 
tasks assigned in their OPLANs and CONPLANS.  In today’s fiscally constrained 
environment ACC staff does not see wing commands spending funds on large force 
exercises or joint training when money may not even be available to sustain current 
flying operations or maintenance costs.  All agreed the smaller defense budget has the 
potential to make the differences in joint and wing diamonds larger as Wing/CCs 
prioritize necessities first.   
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Some argued the new AFIS will also create a larger difference between joint and 
wing operations.  Since the new AFIS evaluates the CC’s ability to lead and manage his 
own inspection program, they felt CCs would concentrate more on internal issues verses 
external connections.  This inward looking perspective further separates wings from the 
larger joint SoS as commanders put all their resources towards correcting internal issues 
while ignoring areas with cross wing or service implications.  
Operational Wing Personnel Perspectives 
Discussions with unit personnel concurred with the ACC staff perspectives of 
joint versus AFIS realities.  Conversations included pilots, maintainers, and intelligence 
personnel from the following platforms:  RC-135, JSTARS, Global Hawk, 
Predator/Reaper, ASOS, F-16, C-130, AWACS, and F-15E.  All personnel agreed that 
large-scale exercises provided better evaluations of combat readiness.  Wing personnel 
concurred with ACC staff members that wing exercises6 often simulate key operational 
components.  Further, personnel noted wing exercises do not provide opportunities to 
conduct operations with other service air or ground assets.  Lacking these elements makes 
it difficult to correctly assess wing readiness or adequately prepare for joint operations.  
Examples provided included synchronizing timing with other units, joint mission 
planning and rehearsal, and direct interaction with ground control, airborne control, and 
                                                
 
 
 
6 Wing exercises are often referred to as operational readiness exercises (ORE) or ORIs 
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ISR platforms.  Other differences noted included lack of realistic scenarios and the 
inability to test equipment across networks.  Most personnel stated they experienced 
varying degrees of interoperability issues throughout their deployment.  Initial integration 
issues were identified as a large problem.  Overtime, personnel noted issues became 
smaller; however, the dynamic nature of operations sometimes caused new issues or 
further complicated others. 
An example from several ISR wing inspections, under the current and old AFIS, 
provides insight into the limitations of single wing inspections.  During wing exercises 
and inspections, personnel revealed ISR aircraft often do not conduct live or simulated 
operations.  The aircraft take off in order to demonstrate the capability to generate sorties 
however, there is often no mission to test/demonstrate the platform’s ISR capability.  
Personnel cited time, money, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) restrictions, 
planning constraints, and leadership as reasons why this occurs.  In addition, personnel 
stated simulators (which can be linked to live or virtual exercises) are outdated and do not 
provide the same fidelity as actual missions.  Simulator availability was also identified as 
an issue.  Some wings have noted these deficiencies using the new CCIP; however, others 
did not.  When asked why, several personnel stated the higher deployment tempo for ISR 
platforms keeps personnel well trained.  This statement independently validates the 
hypothesis.  Units are using real operations as training environments, relying on the 
larger SoS to provide the necessary realism.   
Many aircrew and intelligence personnel stated Large Force Exercises (LFE) 
provided better feedback on wing readiness.  LFEs place an emphasis on successful 
integration in order to achieve mission objectives.  LFEs act as a venue for testing and 
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refining TTPs or Concept of Operations (CONOP), reducing integration risk by 
identifying areas of concern prior to deployment.  LFEs mirror combat operations by 
generating scenarios that require units to interact and integrate in order to achieve 
mission success.  Combat operations place importance on synchronizing effects to ensure 
mission completion.  In contrast, internal wing inspections often place the emphasis on 
procedures.  JP 1-02’s definition of interoperability, given earlier, reiterates this point.  
LFEs provide a platform to resolve cross service issues at the lowest level.  However, 
several personnel mentioned issues such as conflicting TTPs, network/communications 
problems, and logistics/planning differences regularly emerge during LFEs (or during 
joint deployments).  Sometimes, these issues transcend the wing level and permeate 
throughout the AF and other services.  In these situations, an IG focused and trained to 
understand the larger SoS could use its position to benefit all branches.  As an 
independent evaluator, the IG’s access to higher-level CCs would allow the quick 
resolution of interoperability issues. 
ACC staff members and personnel were asked to identify reasons why the current 
AFIS conducts single wing inspections and what benefits exist to this method.  The 
primary reason identified for single wing inspections was simplicity.  Single wing 
inspections reduce the required number of inspectors.  Inspecting multiple wings 
simultaneously requires additional resources to ensure the availability of enough 
inspectors for each location.  In addition, a single wing inspection provides a simple 
method for identifying the source of problems and assigning responsibility.  In addition, 
most wings identify themselves as having a unique mission, making it impossible to 
equally compare results.  Inspecting a single wing allows the IG to tailor its needs and 
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checklists for each wing to accommodate the variety of unit missions.  During 
conversations with the IG, they agreed with all these points.  They added single wing 
inspections also make trend analysis easy, allowing quick publication of corrective 
guidance.    
Collaborating Field Research and Data 
A 2011 survey of active duty intelligence units in ACC supports the staff and 
wing personnel’s thoughts on the lack of joint training opportunities.  Among other 
questions, the survey asked units to report on pre-deployment training specific to the 
wing’s deployed function and theater specific spin up training.  Findings revealed that on 
average only two percent of wing intelligence personnel were funded to attend focused 
pre-deployment training (15th Intel Squadron, 2011).  Thirty five percent of wings said 
spin up training was adequate at best (fifty five percent had no comment).  Only forty one 
percent felt their units were prepared to accomplish the deployed mission.  The report 
noted that at one time ACC offered a pre-deployment/theater spin up course that provided 
units with specific training on current TTPs employed down range (15th Intel Squadron, 
2011).  The course used a feedback loop to ensure units had the latest information before 
leaving the US.  The report did not mention when and why the course was canceled 
however, it did mention the course stopped prior to this survey (15th Intel Squadron, 
2011).   
Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports over the past two decades 
support ACC’s findings, identifying the lack of joint training opportunities as a primary 
cause for integration and interoperability issues (1992) (1998) (2005).   In 2009, the DoD 
published DoD Directive 1322.18, requiring all training be built around “an open, net 
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centric, interoperable standard” focused on meeting COCOM requirements (Department 
of Defense, 2009).  The Air Force Scientific Advisory Board echoed the GAO findings in 
a 2005 report stating the lack of joint SoS planning, preparation, and training created 
situations in which “the unanticipated need for system to system interactions too often 
require clever ad hoc work-arounds” (2005).  Further, the 2005 report listed four 
battlefield consequences created by a lack of joint SoS planning: “1) JFCs cannot take 
full advantage of assets, 2) capabilities are ‘late to the need’, 3) unanticipated CONOPS 
‘work-arounds’ developed on the fly, and 4) users had to compensate for weak 
interoperability designs” (United States Air Force Scientific Advisory Board).  
While training and LFEs can help correct deficiencies in interoperability and 
integration, an inspection system must be in place to enforce standards.  Training 
programs require evaluations to provide feedback on the program’s quality and accuracy.   
In addition, evaluations ensure personnel are proficient at their assigned tasks.  AFIs 11-
202 and 14-202 (aircrew and intelligence regulations respectively) each contain three 
volumes.  Volume one of each series is dedicated to training.  Volume two is dedicated to 
standardization and evaluation and ensuring the training program meets all expectations.  
The IG is ACC’s evaluator and is responsible for identifying and addressing these larger 
issues of interoperability and integration.   
Research in the area of battlefield fratricide shows a direct connection between 
the causes of fratricide and service branches failing to acknowledge the larger joint 
context during training, exercises, and planning.  This failure leads to increased risk 
which could be mitigated through a joint SoS approach to inspections.  A study by Hewitt 
and Webb from the United States Army Aeromedical Research Laboratory (USAARL) 
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linked fratricide to several of the factors identified by ACC staff members and personnel.  
Their research shows an increase in the percentage of fratricide events since WWI.  The 
cases they analyzed involved several cross service incidents (example:  AF pilots fire on 
Army personnel).  The level and complexity of warfare, and a heavy reliance on 
technology, were identified as two underlying forces attributing to the increased fratricide 
rate, but not the sole reasons (Hewett & Webb, 2010).  The most common causes of 
fratricide were related to three categories.  First, misidentification which included three 
related findings: “combat identification measures, the actions of the target, and the 
physical features of the target” (Hewett & Webb, 2010).  Categories two and three were 
teamwork and procedures respectively.  Training was identified as a common factor 
related to these three categories.  In their conclusion, Hewett and Webb recommended 
military leaders “should stress the importance of training, education, and leadership,” in 
order to combat fratricide (2010).  They further noted the heavy dependence on 
technology created an air of overconfidence in abilities.  This overconfidence often 
prevented soldiers from “double checking plans,” and reduced information sharing 
(Hewett & Webb, 2010).  
A separate study conducted by Gadsden and Outteridge came to similar 
conclusions.  Their root cause analysis identified the top four reasons as communication 
and information flow, Command and Control (C2), procedures, and misidentification 
(Gadsden & Outteridge, 2006).  Reliance on technology was identified as a minor 
contributing factor.  Gadsden and Outteridge concluded there is never a single reason for 
a fratricide event.  Instead, the compilation of several factors resulting in a loss of 
situational awareness is the most likely cause (Gadsden & Outteridge, 2006).  The 
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compilation of factors equates to the compounding effect of risks.  Gadsden and 
Outteridge did not specify ways to resolve these issues; however, since the results are 
similar to Hewett and Webb’s work, better training and preparation are potential 
solutions.   
Major Russell Hart in 2004 and Commander Robert Rasmussen in 2007 published 
similar qualitative studies on the increasing percentage of fratricide cases.  Their articles 
share similar thoughts on the rapid pace of modern conflict and its impact on human 
factors and the reliance of forces on technology (Hart, 2004) (Rasmussen, 2007).  
According to Hart and Rasmussen, the dynamic nature of modern warfare creates 
situations where “the mission that forces may be tasked to accomplish and the manner in 
which they may be employed may not necessarily coincide with the dedicated mission 
the specific unit or asset was intended to perform” (Hart, 2004).  Maj Hart provides the 
example of B-52’s conducting Close Air Support (CAS) in the early stages of OEF and 
OIF, a role “strategic bombers had not played since Vietnam (Hart, 2004).”  Several of 
these non-traditional combat roles resulted in fratricide or near missing.  New TTPs and 
safety regulations were written after such events occurred (Rasmussen, 2007).  Army and 
Air Force top officials immediately pushed for implementing these new TTPs and 
regulations into joint training and exercises.  Both authors state they feel more joint 
exercises and training would have the greatest effect on reducing fratricide.  Exercises 
and training events highlight areas of incompatibility and allow the development and 
writing of TTPs and regulations prior to combat operations (Hart, 2004) (Rasmussen, 
2007).  Further, both cite the high ops tempo forcing soldiers to rely more heavily on 
technology to build Situational Awareness (SA).  Hart and Rasmussen pointed to the lack 
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of compatibility between several identify friend or foe and blue force tracking systems 
currently in use, citing soldiers heavily relied on this technology to be true at all times 
(Hart, 2004) (Rasmussen, 2007).  Miss-identification was cited as a primary reason for 
fratricide in both reports as well as being identified in Gadsden and Outteridge’s and 
Hewitt and Webb’s works (although not a prime reason in either case).  Hart’s and 
Rasmussen’s stories on the overuse of technology also relates to Hewett and Webb’s 
overconfidence factor.  An incomplete picture of the battlefield compounds the problems 
created by a lack of joint awareness/training. 
The qualitative and quantitative examples of the previous paragraphs show the 
need for early integration of forces at the lowest levels in order to help reduce combat 
risk.  Factors identified in these studies on fratricide complement discussion with ACC 
staff and personnel and explain the larger joint operational risk diamond.  Joint training, 
operations, and exercises demonstrate levels of increased risk due to the added 
complexity and pace of warfare.  Joint forces rely on each other to provide specific 
capabilities to accomplish strategic, operational, and tactical level operations.  Inherent in 
that trust is the mutual understanding of TTPs, guidance, regulations, and a refined 
practice.  A major component of the UEI though is to assess and identify wing level risks 
which could impede combat readiness with the goal of shrinking the difference between 
combat and inspection ready.  A SoS perspective layered over the AFIS should identify 
additional joint risks prior to deployments, allowing for the development and 
implementation of risk mitigation strategies/plans. 
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Deployment Findings 
A recent deployment supporting MC-12 operations in Southeast Asia reiterates 
several of the points identified by staff and wing personnel.   
In the Central Command (CENTCOM) theater of operations, the Reconnaissance, 
Surveillance, Targeting and Acquisition (RSTA) annex to the ATO lists all the ISR 
sensors’ taskings for a specific day.  The process to develop the RSTA and the 
information it contains highlights the integrated nature of modern warfare.   To request 
ISR support for upcoming operations, units submit requests through collection managers.  
Collection managers translate requests into requirements. These requirements are input 
into a database where the Joint Collection Management Board (JCMB) sorts and 
prioritizes the requirements. The JCMB provides the prioritized list to the Combined Air 
Operations Center (CAOC) where a team assigns an ISR sensor to fulfill the requirement.  
The RSTA provides baseline information for who, what, when, where, and how each 
sensor will support operations.  Units use the RSTA to gather additional mission details 
through direct contact with supported users and other agencies.  This decentralized 
execution allows assigned platforms flexibility to properly support its customer at the 
right time and place.  
Interoperability issues often arise as a result of the RSTA.  This process normally 
assigns an AF platform to support a non-AF unit.  A lack of understanding in capabilities, 
TTPs, and responsibilities between the two users impedes mission success.  The MC-12 
MULTI-INT aircraft is a prime example.  The majority of MC-12 missions fly in support 
of US Army or Marine ground forces.  Ground CCs were often not familiar with the MC-
12 platform or its capabilities.  Lacking this knowledge, many ground units under or 
 
62 
 
incorrectly utilized the MC-12.  In addition, AF pilots lacked the required training to read 
ground schemes of maneuver, making permission planning and coordination difficult.  
The MC-12 wing started a liaison program to educate ground forces on the platform’s 
capabilities.  This along with post mission debriefs with supported users helped mitigate 
integration issues.   
Further, MC-12 aircrews were authorized to provide air warden duties for large 
ground operations.  This role required MC-12 crewmembers to manage and direct all 
aircraft supporting an operation.  Mission CCs cross-talked with all participating air 
assets, relaying commands from ground force and vice versa.  Only mission CCs holding 
current air warden certifications were authorized to perform this duty.  Home station 
training; however, lacked the resources to provide this certification before a mission 
commander deployed.  The home station training program did not have a robust enough 
scenario to accomplish this task.  Once deployed, mission CCs received training “on the 
fly” during actual missions in order to receive their air warden certification.   
The MC-12 also provided buddying lasing for strike aircraft to fire guided 
munitions.  Similar to air warden certification, MC-12 operators received training down 
range during actual combat missions.  Never trained in munitions planning, the lack of 
knowledge on weapons effects hindered operations.  MC-12 personnel were not familiar 
with important considerations to ensure successful target engagement.  Details 
concerning run in headings and release angles to mitigate Collateral Damage Estimates 
(CDE) or provide the strike platform a better visual on the target were new subjects for 
MC-12 operators.  Joint exercises on military ranges in theater established the buddying 
lasing TTPs and certification requirements. 
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Another adjunct role provided by the MC-12 was medical evacuation relay.  
Ground forces encountering communications issues due to distance, equipment failure, 
frequency differences, or jamming sometimes could not communicate their requirement 
for medical support.  Or once in route, ground forces would not know the callsign and 
frequency on which to communicate the medical platform.  MC-12 aircrew became radio 
relay assets during these situations, passing 9 line information as well as situational 
updates and possible threats to inbound rescue platforms.   During TTP development 
(again conducted in the deployed environment), ground personnel explained that during 
homestation exercises, air lift is simulated and all the callsign and frequency information 
is provided beforehand.  In addition, many ground units never simulated or practiced 
procedures to mitigate jamming or work around other communication issues.   
Inspecting MC-12 mission capability requires testing aircrew proficiency in all 
mission areas.  Many of these situations are difficult to test or capture in a single wing 
inspection.  The only way to assess mission capability in today’s joint environment is to 
evaluate a system within the joint SoS architecture.   
Further research revealed two similar integration issues.  Air to ground fighter 
units often deploy with an embedded Army Ground Liaison Officer (GLO).   This 
position, as well as those at Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS) sites, was 
intended to increase interoperability and reduce operational risks between services.  
Coordination and communication issues between AF and Army personnel resulting in 
impaired operations highlighted the need to provide inter-service liaisons (i.e. translate 
Army talk to AF language and vice versa).  Army liaisons facilitate cross talk between 
aircrew, Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTAC), and ground forces CCs, interpret 
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CONOPS/Scheme of Manuevers (SoM), support mission planning, and provide 
awareness training to AF personnel.  The DCGS utilizes Naval Intelligence personnel for 
the same reason.  These issues and their solutions were identified and tested during LFEs 
or combat operations.    
Findings:  Unit of Analysis 2 – Joint Readiness Assessment and Metrics 
Integrating a joint SoS architecture into the current AFIS does not require a 
completely new system.  The framework shown in Figure 1 provides a good foundation 
while already existing capabilities can be leveraged to make integration smoother and 
quicker.  Implementing a joint SoS in the AFIS provides a means for breaking down 
barriers related to interoperability and expanding upon the IG’s current function of 
identifying risk and ensuring combat readiness.  The IG as an independent organization 
can reach across services to identify root causes impacting joint operations and driving 
change.  Further, expanding the AFIS aperture to include the joint SoS creates an 
organization capturing lessons learned and studying growing trends to potentially identify 
areas of future risk.   General Hostage, ACC/CC, summarized the importance of joint 
interoperability stating, “Partnerships improve operational effectiveness and increase 
integration of air force, joint, allied, and coalition capabilities in advanced threat 
environments” (Hostage, 2014). 
Joint Characteristics 
This section collects and expands upon the joint characteristics mentioned 
throughout this work.  It should be acknowledged that these are not “new” characteristics 
by any means but have been pulled from joint and AF regulations as well as from articles 
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by other government agencies/think tanks and non-government organizations from as 
early as 1987.  While some of these documents contained additional characteristics, all 
stated the need for a more integrated and interoperable, rapidly deployed and tailored 
forces, which can easily “plug and play” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2003).  Discussions with 
the personnel listed in the Sources section helped limit this list to four characteristics:  1) 
Rapid integration, 2) Rapid interoperability, 3) Joint training, 4) Flexibility/adaptability.  
Additional characteristics mentioned where:  1) Rapid mobility, 2) Net-centric, 3) 
Tailored, and 4) Joint awareness.  Rapid mobility and net-centric were combined with the 
definitions for rapid integration and interoperability while joint awareness was combined 
with joint training.  Tailored was eliminated from the list since it is the JFCC’s job to 
decide which forces he/she requires to complete the mission. 
In addition to implementing these characteristics within the IG checklist, the joint 
SoS architecture requires a mindset change in ACC wings.  Personnel must begin to 
acknowledge the relationship between units and the joint SoS and the affects each 
component has on the other.  The mindset shift affects wing TTPs, decision-making, and 
planning; however, adopting the joint SoS architecture aligns with the intended focus of 
the UEI and the force with combat readiness. 
Adapting Figure 1, Figure 11 shows how the joint architecture would integrate 
with the current UEI MGAs.  Adding the characteristics does not require changing the 
UEI rating system, which assigns each MGA an equal apportionment (25%).  The large 
orange box represents the joint SoS mindset while the smaller green boxes identify areas 
where joint SoS characteristics could be added to the UEI checklist.   
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Figure 11:  New AFIS UEI with focus on the joint SoS 
o Rapid integration – Defines a wing’s ability to quickly assemble with 
other services and stand up operations in any environment.  The 
characteristic focuses on creating a working and sustainable joint force.  
Rapid integration occurs on a much quicker time scale than current 
operations and requires wings to utilize and understand other service 
equipment.  It requires wings to integrate capabilities quickly in order to 
quickly prosecute assigned mission.  Rapid integration exploits time as a 
weakness and requires the swift integration of forces who can immediately 
conduct operations on short notice.  To achieve this affect, wings must 
engage with other service components assigned to the same 
OPLAN/CONPLAN.  Training should focus on the capabilities and 
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communication equipment of other service assets and studying the wings 
role within the larger framework.  Services should pre-coordinate 
necessary equipment to reduce weight and redundancy.  Sharing resources 
saves time and reduces the logistical trail. 
o Rapid interoperability – Works hand in hand with rapid integration.  This 
characteristic assesses a wings ability to quickly share information and 
capabilities to create synergistic effects focused on overwhelming the 
enemy.  Interoperability should be developed prior to deploying, as 
services should exercise regularly in order to build and refine TTPs, test 
communication equipment, activate networks, and develop redundant or 
alternative methods. 
o Joint Training – A specific task to ensure Wing/CCs are provided with and 
in turn are offering joint training opportunities to their personnel.  Training 
should be properly documented upon completion and trainees should share 
their experience with the rest of the wing.  This characteristic looks at how 
the Wing/CC manages his/her training budget and balances joint 
requirements against platform requirements.  It also looks at how often the 
wing participates in multi-unit or joint exercises over a year period.  
Outside a joint exercise, successfully meeting this requirement stipulates 
wings maintain a robust training program based on assigned OPLANs and 
CONPLANs.  These training programs should contain sections dedicated 
to friend force capabilities, interoperability issues, assigned 
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responsibilities, and the affects of the wing’s role on the larger operation.  
Finally, the characteristic looks to ensure leadership (W/CC at a 
minimum) have attended a joint training course.  This characteristic looks 
to reduce risks associated with failing to understand the larger operation 
and failing to know other service capabilities/limitations.   
o Flexibility/Adaptability – This characteristic ties in with integration and 
interoperability.  Flexibility and adaptability look at a wings capability to 
support other mission outside its primary and assigned missions.  The use 
of B-52 aircraft in a CAS role is an example from OEF/OIF.  It examines a 
leader’s ability to identify opportunities and weigh the risks and rewards.  
It analysis how rapidly and efficiently wings can change missions and how 
well the wing uses its equipment.  Flexibility and adaptability tests a 
wing’s ability to rapidly mission plan, identify other resources available 
(could be another service), and utilize those resources to successfully 
conduct the mission.   
Leveraging Current Resources 
Identifying joint characteristics is a key first step in integrating a joint SoS into 
the AFIS.  However, implementing these characteristics requires the resources and means 
by which to evaluate them. 
Currently there is a plethora of joint, service, and coalition exercises ranging from 
larger scale operations to mission specific events.  These exercises present a logical place 
to implement a new joint SoS AFIS.  Additional areas to explore include geographically 
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related bases hosting regional exercises and the use of simulators for networked 
exercises.  In addition, the new AEF Next model creates a perfect cycle for integrating a 
LFE for rotational forces.  This work does not contain an all-inclusive list.  It does; 
however, provide examples of how to implement a joint SoS within these exercises and 
why exercises provide a perfect fit.   
Operation Angel Thunder, for example, is a joint exercise focusing specifically on 
personnel recovery.  Since its inception in 2006, Operation Angel Thunder continues to 
grow in size and scope.  Over the last several iterations, the exercise organizers have 
added new scenarios and expanded the depth and breadth of training personnel receive.  
Recently developed scenarios focus on rescue operations in jungle environments and at 
extended ranges to account for aerial denial situations.  Several ISR platforms and 
coalition partners have also joined in, demonstrating/providing new capabilities and 
producing new TTPs for integrated operations.  The MC-12, for example, initially 
developed its PR TTPs at Operations Angel Thunder.  Once downrange, the wing refined 
its PR TTPs, becoming a valuable communications relay asset for PR and aeromedical 
evacuation assets7.   
                                                
 
 
 
7 Personnel recovery and aeromedical evacuation are not taught at the MC-12 school house nor 
have they been tested in wing exercises.  These TTPs and capabilities were only discovered through joint 
exercises 
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In addition, many of these joint scenarios/exercises continue to grow, involving 
cyber, space, RPAs, and coalition partners.  Red Flag, the AF’s premier training event, 
recently integrated all these facets into its 2014 exercise deck.   These four areas 
represent areas of interest to the joint chiefs and service secretaries.   Red Flag was 
specifically designed to provide cross platform and cross service training in a simulated 
real operational environment.  The exercises force services to operate together, learn each 
others TTPs, and rely upon each other to exploit the enemy’s weaknesses through 
combined affects (99th Air Base Wing Public Affairs, 2012).  
Red Flag 14-1 saw more than 125 aircraft from the US AF, Navy, and Marine 
Corp attend the exercise, as well as aircraft and personnel from the Royal Australian Air 
Force and Royal Air Force of the United Kingdom.  According to General Hostage, 
soldiers, sailors, and airmen “participated in advanced training, improving integration and 
interoperability amongst our joint and allied partners” (Hostage, 2014).  Events like Red 
Flag develop those synergistic effects, which translate into future mission success.  
The AFIS could also adopt a geographical approach to inspections.  Exercise 
Razor Talon is an east coast exercise hosted by Seymour Johnson AFB.  Started as a way 
to augment Red Flag and provide additional training for deploying units, Razor Talon has 
expanded into a large joint force event.  Unlike Red Flag, participating units prepare, 
plan, and fly from their own bases.  Exercise coordination and planning takes place over 
teleconferences, Video Teleconferencing (VTC), or Defense Connect Online (DCO) Chat 
functions.  Wings alternate acting as the CAOC, directing and leading exercise 
operations.  Scenarios range from CAS, offensive counter air, to strike escort and 
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Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD).  In addition, access to ranges with 
simulated threats increases the exercises’ complexity. 
The exercise has emerged as a popular venue due to its integrated nature with 
other service and international partners.  The exercise provides a rare opportunity to 
interact with and fully understand the capabilities and limitations of the various assets. 
“For example, Air Force pilots have opportunities to hear ship communications over the 
radio” or fly and communicate with British and French forces (Boland, 2013). 
In addition, the complexities of running such a large exercise, as well as hosting 
coalition partners, create multiple interoperability and communication challenges.  
Personnel improvise solutions on the go, learning valuable lessons about joint operations.  
From its inception, the goal of Razor Talon was to “train like forces fight, and in the 
field, the various nations are going to stand side by side” (Boland, 2013).  Planners 
wanted to provide as much realistic training as possible to help services and coalition 
partners understand the challenges combine operations can create.   Col Birch, 4th 
OSS/CC stated (Boland, 2013):  
“Through the exercises, decision makers have realized that they remain 
unfamiliar with what real joint domain command and control is. For 
example, the Air Force is still working out how to put surface vessels on 
its network, a task integral to the Air-Sea Battle Concept.” 
 
On a smaller scale, the AFIS could organize joint inspections around states or 
areas with larger concentration of military bases.  Virginia’s Hampton Roads area is a 
perfect example with Naval, Army, and AF bases all within 40 miles of each other.  
Alaska, California, Georgia, New Mexico, and Texas also have multiple service bases 
near each other. 
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The capability exits to link actual AF, Navy, and Army assets participating in live 
exercises with simulators and virtual trainers.  Live Virtual Environment (LVE) and Live 
Virtual Constructive (LVC) training/exercises are two commonly used terms 
synonymous with these network link exercises.  These two terms will be used 
interchangeably throughout this work. The ability to join live missions with simulators 
increasing the number of participants, the diversity of assets, and the level of realism.  
LVEs gives planners the ability to shape the battlefield environment, providing control of 
the weather, allowing injects to simulate the “fog and friction” of war, as well as 
replicating threat systems, ranging from jamming, Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD), and air threats, to name a few.  The three services share similar future plans for 
LVE training, all budgeting for newer more realistic simulators, expanded network 
capabilities and nodes, increased data rates, upgrades to existing simulators, and software 
solutions to include more assets (Catanzano, 2011).  The three services are also pursuing 
LVE capabilities, which will allow coalition partners to participate (Blacklock & 
Zalcman, 2010). 
In a recent article Colonel John T. Janiszewski, Director of the Army’s National 
Simulation Center (NSC), stated virtual training “replicates the difficulties and 
complications of the operational environment, enabling leaders and units to gain the 
experience, confidence and skills required to execute decisive action” (Janiszewski, 
2014).  Further (and more relevant to current fiscal constraints), Col Janiszewski sees an 
increased need and reliance on virtual training as augmenting or replacing live training.  
Col Janiszewski stated virtual training is “effective, low-cost individual and collective 
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training for soldiers and leaders” posing a viable alternative to expensive large force 
exercises (Janiszewski, 2014).   
ACC currently owns and operates the Distributed Mission Operations Center 
(DMOC) located at Kirtland AFB, NM.  The DMOC allows strategic, operational, and 
tactical level virtual training allowing simulation across the range of military operations.  
In addition, the DMOC “provides network connectivity to joint and coalition players 
around the world” (Kirtland AFB Public Affairs Office, 2014). The DMOC hosts ACC’s 
Virtual Flag (VF), “a CJCS sponsored, large force exercise designed to increase combat 
capability across the Theater Air Control System and its elements” (Horne, 2013).  In 
addition to VF, the DMOC hosts other LVEs for specific assets.  The DMOC can 
replicate threat environments/systems and simulate attacks, forcing personnel to 
cooperate and interact as they would in real life.  Brigadier General Bradford J. Shwedo, 
former Director of Intelligence ACC, stated in a policy memo to the field, “VF is an 
excellent opportunity for the Air Force intelligence community to ‘train like we fight’ 
and to identify any shortfalls in our current training plans” (Shwedo, 2013). 
The AEF Next concept explained in Chapter 2 creates an easy launching point for 
CCs and the IG to implement the new AFIS.  AEF Next packages units into air power 
teams focused around core missions.  Since the AEF Next concept centers on a teaming 
concept, air power teams will always deploy with the same units and personnel.   The IG 
could implement LFEs around these air power teams capturing the units’ ability to work 
amongst other teams.  At any given time, the new AEF Next cycle has one team 
returning, one team deployed, and one team preparing.  The returning team and the 
preparing teams could engage in a LFE for increased knowledge and experience 
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dissemination.  The returning team would act as a “red” team.  Having just returned, their 
knowledge of the enemy and emerging TTPs would provide a sound foundation for 
assessing readiness.  While intra-service, this system would still open the training 
aperture ensuring wings interoperate and integrate at the AF level.   
On a larger scale, further work could investigate if the AEF Next system aligns 
with other service deployment cycles.  In the same fashion, a joint LFE could be 
conducted with returning and preparing forces.  If it does not, research could be 
conducted to determine how difficult it would be to adapt the AEF Next cycle to 
synchronize with other services.   
Findings:  Unit of Analysis 3 – Limitations of the SoS Approach 
IG Perspective 
Discussions with ACC/IG personnel regarding integrating a joint SoS architecture 
into the AFIS provide insight into their current philosophy.  The AF core values represent 
and reflect the joint nature of today’s military.  The joint competencies were developed 
by the services and the AF embodies these competencies in its doctrine, philosophy, and 
values.  The number of shared weapon systems, TTPs, and communications equipment 
used today, by all the services, continues to grow, and the AF led the procurement of 
several of these systems.  “Jointness” is percolating down to the wings and units through 
the philosophical changes at the headquarters level and exemplified in the AF core 
competencies:  Developing Airmen, technology to war fighting and integrating 
operations (Air Combat Command, 2013).  Units share resources, lessons learned, and 
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TTPs more often these days providing a continuous cycle of growth at the wing level and 
below.   
The AFIS places an emphasis on the Wing/CC’s ability to lead and develop 
his/her wing as he/she feels necessary.  In creating a Wing/IG role, the new AFIS is 
attempting to create “buy in” from wing personnel.  It is attempting to break away from 
the old philosophy where units prepared for IG inspections then redid everything in 
preparation for deploying.  The Wing/CC creates his/her own inspection program, 
identifying their areas of concern, improvement, and/or strengths.  Since the Wing/CCs 
create the checklists, the AFIS found a way to capture the unique functions of every unit.  
The Wing/CCs drives how “joint” capable the wing is through his/her CCIP, based on the 
wing’s assigned OPLAN/CONPLANS, its unique qualities/missions, vision, and goal.  
These changes to the AFIS were developed to create the mission ready attitude and focus 
mentioned earlier.   
The role of the MAJCOM/IG is to observe and audit how well the Wing/IG 
program articulates the CC’s vision and goal and inspects, documents, and follows up on 
wing deficiencies.  In areas where the MAJCOM/IG does not feel the CCIP is properly 
identifying and capturing risks, the MAJCOM/IG can step in and correct or ask to 
observe operations.  Unless directed from above, the MAJCOM/IG does not enforce an 
agenda.  The ACC/IG philosophy is that individual wing inspections identify enough risk 
that integration into the larger SoS is minimal.  The governing regulations which form the 
basis for MAJCOM and wing IG programs are developed in accordance with AF core 
competencies and thus capture the joint criteria necessary for integration.  The ACC/IG 
believes the Wing/CC is the optimal person to decide the wing’s priorities and the 
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necessary joint priorities.  In addition, the AFIS allows Wing/CCs to use exercises, 
training, and deployment results to highlight wing performance and complete/validate 
inspection items as long as results are documented and verified by the wing/IG (Secretary 
of the Air Force, 2012).  Further, per 90-201 the MAJCOM/IG still reserves the right to 
conduct no or little notice inspections or mandate wings conduct “ORI” like events to 
validate CCIP findings.  Bottom line, ACC/IG’s philosophy maintains that AF core 
competencies are based on joint requirements.  Wings will practice their roles as defined 
in their OPLAN/CONPLANS and execute those roles in combat.  The IG grades the 
individual wings and hopes the pieces, when put together during joint operations, 
integrate and interoperate based on prior practice.   
According to IG personnel, there has never been a joint inspection or meeting of 
service IG programs to discuss joint operations.  Further, within ACC, there has never 
been a multi-wing inspection, nor have ACC/IG personnel attended LFEs with the intent 
of inspecting units.  Whenever possible, the ACC/IG Gatekeeper, who organizes and 
schedules all inspections levied on ACC units, ensures inspections are TF.  TF refers to 
wings that have an associated guard or reserve squadron.  In these cases all units are 
inspected at once.  In addition, all ACC/IG inspections include a red air component to 
help simulate adversary tactics.  Anti-Access/Aerial Denial (A2/AD) and 
contested/degraded operations where added to ACC/IG inspections in late 2011 and 
quickly become more common. 
LFE Resource Burdon 
The ACC/IG provided details defending a single wing inspection construct.  The 
four reasons provided closely match those given by ACC staff and wing personnel  
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1)  funding 
2)  a small cadre of inspectors 
3)  synchronization 
4)  identify unique wing functions. 
When inspecting multiple systems interacting at once, it becomes difficult to see the 
minor details occurring behind the larger operation.  The MAJCOM/IG looks to increase 
wing efficiency and identify areas of risk.  While primary operations may look good, 
subsurface operations may be weak.  During LFEs, MAJCOM/IG personnel may miss 
subtle details due to the added commotion.  Compounding this issue is the need for 
additional inspectors to cover the additional wings participating in the joint exercise.  
Also, geographically separated wings create communication challenges for MAJCOM/IG 
personnel.  The strength of a single wing inspection is having all inspectors at one 
location.  Inspectors can hold impromptu meetings to quick deliberate and share 
information.  These meetings are a critical part of the inspection process, keeping all 
inspectors informed of findings.  Adding other service organizations adds to these issues.   
The coordination efforts required to synchronize a joint exercise, inspectors, and 
communication from each of the service components imposes significant manpower and 
time requirements.  Funding is really a by-product of the three previously mentioned 
reasons but is necessary to hire additional inspectors and offset the added costs for 
planning and coordinating LFEs. 
LFEs as a training Environment 
Allowing inspectors access to LFEs could distract from the exercise’s intended 
purpose.  Most units use LFEs as opportunities to focus on integration issues, refining 
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proficiency skills, and developing new TTPs.  A pilot referred to LFEs as lower stress 
events meant to improve personal skills and work out the bugs, whereas inspections are 
high stress events focusing on the minute details.  Authorizing MAJCOM/IG personnel to 
monitor LFEs shifts the focus away from personal growth to meeting inspection criteria.  
LFEs are venues for units to fail without repercussions.  With inspectors on sight, units 
may not be willing to take “learning” risks.   
In order to counter this philosophy, MAJCOM/IG personnel must evaluate a 
wing’s performance in light of the LFE’s intended purpose.  The AFIS’s structure, if 
adhered to, compensates for this dilemma.  The MAJCOM/IG’s focus should be on 
monitoring the wing/IG and the Wing/CC’s leadership capability.  If the wing’s IG is 
going to evaluate the unit during the LFE, the MAJCOM/IG should also be authorized.  
This separates out LFEs designed for training and development versus LFEs for mission 
compliance. 
LFEs; however, provide pertinent insight into a wings ability to adapt and flex to 
changing mission conditions, two of the recommended joint characteristics.  Several wing 
personnel pointed out LFEs are often free flowing and a little disorganized which 
presents a challenge to overcome communication issues or unclear guidance.  These are 
two issues units often face during joint operations.  In addition, wing personnel noted 
LFEs (and deployments) sometimes uncover problems that cannot be resolved at the 
wing level.  Personnel noted communication/systems integration issues or conflicting 
guidance/standards between service organizations as two examples.  These issues go 
above wing levels and are outside the scope of a Wing/CC to solve.  Identifying these 
issues prior to deploying greatly reduces risk; however, discovery of these types of 
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integration issues is impossible during single wing inspections.  The MAJCOM/IG is in a 
position to address these issues with other service organizations or at higher AF levels.  
Adopting a joint SoS architecture and attributes compels wings to look at, address, and 
raise these concerns prior to deploying. 
IG and wing personnel also noted that LFEs do not test every aspect of a wings 
mission/capability.  LFEs often focus on one mission or operational aspect and only 
include the required wing functions or organizations.  In this light, the joint SoS provides 
less insight than a regular wing inspection.  There are two ways to correct this shortfall.  
One is to create larger LFEs which engage all organizations.  The second is to send IG 
personnel to more focused exercises (like Angel Thunder) to ensure all components are 
evaluated.  Both corrections require additional funds and time.   
Competing Systems 
The Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) is a CJCS program designed to 
provide JFCs and COCOMs a more efficient and effective tool for quickly identifying the 
readiness status of forces down to the unit level (for the AF, squadron level).  DRRS also 
synthesizes “unit and joint force readiness to describe the ability of the armed forces as a 
whole to fight and meet the demands of the National Military Strategy,” and can reflect 
the current readiness of all COCOMS (Trunkey, 2013).  DRRS pulls unit manpower, 
equipment, training, and readiness information from the AF’s AEF UTC Reporting Tool 
(ART) and DoDs Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) databases.  In 
addition, DRRS allows commanders to input supplementary information which may 
impact readiness like morale and unit confidence.  DRRS also asks CCs to rate a “unit 
against its actual assigned mission, anticipated mission, and core mission” (Trunkey, 
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2013).  The assigned mission comes from the unit’s Designed Operational Capability 
(DOC) statement and the core mission comes from what the weapon system was 
designed to do.  The capability of DRRS to capture qualitative and quantitative 
information makes it a valuable tool for CCs to identify deficiencies.   
DRRS is not fully implemented across the services but is expected to become 
fully operational in 2014 (Trunkey, 2013).  Overall, DRRS does show promise as a way 
to capture unit readiness information as well as larger COCOM readiness.  However, it 
lacks a way to identify risks associated with interoperability or integration.  To assess 
COCOM readiness, DRRS tabulates scores from multiple units and provides an overall 
score.  The DRRS score does represent risk, based on the numerical difference between 
all units reporting 100% readiness and actual readiness values.  In addition, DRRS does 
not independently verify and validate CCs’ inputs.  ACC/IG and Staff members, who 
currently work with DRRS, ART, and SORTs, stated it is easy to “cover up” wing issues 
in these programs as they are computer entries and authorized inputs are not always clear.  
CCs do not want to look bad on paper and often inflate scores to appear healthier than 
they actually are. 
Investigative Questions Answered 
Chapter 4 provided answers to all five investigative questions found in Chapter 1.  
Question one though was primarily answered in Chapter 2.   
1. How does the Air Force align/posture forces for joint operations? 
2. What is the focus of the current ACC/IG Inspection system? 
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3. How does the current system account for the integrated nature of military 
assets during operations? 
4. What system-of-systems examples or incidents exist that have a direct relation 
to an operational readiness inspection? 
5. What system-of-systems metrics or attributes can be used to evaluate and 
determine the status and health of ACC units? 
Summary 
Chapter 4 presented supporting data to defend the hypothesis through validation 
of three UOAs.  UOA 1 explained key differences between the AFIS single wing 
inspection system and joint operations.  A risk analysis identified how these differences 
translate into increased risk when wings operate in a joint environment.  Conversations 
with AF personnel, fratricide statistics, and deployment experiences provided additional 
facts and explanations supporting the risk analysis results.  UOA 2 explored several joint 
characteristics which should be added to the UEI checklist to help incorporate a joint SoS 
approach into the current AFIS.  UOA 2 further examined how adopting a joint SoS 
architecture requires a mentality shift where mission readiness means joint readiness.  
This mentality shift leverages the new UEI joint characteristics to help refocus wings.  
Last, UOA 2 provides example exercises or existing capabilities (simulators) which allow 
the IG to implement a new joint SoS AFIS in short order.  UOA 3 provided counter 
arguments to adopting a joint SoS and included discussion and comments from ACC/IG 
personnel.   
Chapter 4 clearly showed there is a need to approach the AFIS from a SoS 
approach.  There currently exists large amounts of risk between wing and joint 
operations.  If not addressed, the level of risk will continue to increase as the military 
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moves towards a smaller more integrated force.  This change requires a paradigm shift in 
how ACC defines unit readiness and its willingness to lead the change where mission 
ready is joint ready 
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V.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
Chapter Overview 
Chapter 5 provides a short synopsis of the previous four chapters highlighting the 
significance of the research as well as recommended actions.  Chapter 5 also contains 
information on future research areas which could affect this work’s conclusions   
Conclusions of Research 
This work identified a source of unknown risk and offered a viable solution.  The 
study showed there is a disparity between wing and joint operations, which the AFIS 
does not fully account for. The AFIS should assess units within the joint operation 
environment to provide a better analysis of wing readiness 
Significance of Research 
Assessing a wing within the joint SoS has many benefits.  First, risks associated 
with integration and interoperability will be reduced.  Second, overall wing readiness will 
improve.  Third, ACC/CC, COCOMs, SECDEF, and JCS will have a way to validate 
DRRS information.  These benefits are significant because the development of a more 
closely aligned and capable force prior to the beginning of hostilities allows CCs to 
immediately exploit the synergistic effects of the services without the normal delays or 
failures systems integration has historically had.  In addition, implementing a joint 
inspection system may reduce fratricide rates by allowing the early detection of the 
leading causes attributing to friendly force incidents. 
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Not implementing the changes recommended in chapter 4 creates an area of 
growing risk.  In the short term units will continue to struggle with integration and 
interoperability.  However, in the long run, as the services become more integrated the 
amount of unchecked risk could lead to failed operations and higher fratricide rates. 
Recommendations for Action 
Recommendations based on this work include three actions necessary to adopt a 
joint SoS architectural viewpoint into today’s AFIS.  The first recommendation is to 
implement the joint characteristics mentioned in Chapter 4, UOA 2.  To due so, ACC/CC 
should issue a Memorandum for Record (MFR) to the field making “jointness” a SII 
within ACC.  Further, the AFIS checklist, MGAs, and AFIs will need to be republished 
to incorporate joint operations and interoperability as key items for wings to practice 
during home station preparation, exercise planning, training, and equipment procurement.   
Recommendation two enhances the first action.  ACC should take lead on 
developing and sustaining additional joint training courses or exercises for all ranks and 
AFSCs.  Within ACC, standardize the definition of joint operations and create a 
mandatory course for all Wing/CCs.  This reduces risks created by the diverse 
backgrounds of wing commanders, which fuels the current inconsistent understanding of 
joint operations.  In addition, ACC should prepare a staff assistance team knowledgeable 
in joint operations to provide support and training to wings as they begin shifting to a 
joint SoS viewpoint. 
The third recommendation involves starting joint inspections.  This 
recommendation should not occur until recommendations two and three are complete.  In 
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the beginning, ACC should implement the joint inspections at a manageable level and 
develop the capability further through trials (similar to spiral development).  Inspections 
should begin in the AF with multi-wing inspections.  Use air power teams as a way to 
select wings.  As inspectors and wings become more comfortable and TTPs are refined, 
integrate other service IG members into AF inspections.  Allow these outside inspector 
the opportunity to participate and add their service viewpoint to inspection results.  From 
here, develop an inter-service inspection working group to define what joint inspections 
are and how they will be handled, graded, reported, etc.   
Recommendation three will require the most work as ACC cannot act unilaterally 
at that point.  It is within ACC’s power to issue an SII on joint operations and conduct 
multi wing inspections of ACC units.  However this only provides a limited view of the 
larger joint SoS.  The services are all pursuing “jointness” but no one is on the same 
page.  Without buy in from other organizations, this plan becomes just another “joint” 
effort without a “joint” understanding.   
Recommendations for Future Research 
Four areas for further examination were identified while conducting research in 
support of this thesis.  Area one pertains to defining the type of SoS architecture 
reflective of joint operations.  This is a System of Systems Engineering (SoSE) question 
that directly impacts how joint operations interact and influence the multiple systems, 
which form the larger SoS.  It is equally important to analyze and determine the different 
types of SoS architectures each service uses.  What is the risk associated with applying 
the wrong SoSE approach?  The DoD SoSE guide currently recognizes virtual and 
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acknowledged architectures as the two prominent SoS architectures.  However, the guide 
is specifically written to address acknowledged SoSs.  It does not address how different 
SoS architectures influence each other or the influences between systems and SoSs.  It 
also does not address what architecture joint operations resemble and how to handle 
constantly changing SoSs.  The relationship between a system and its parent organization 
(service branch) versus its joint organization may change how the characteristics listed in 
Chapter 4 are implemented.  Further research into this area will produce significant 
information on how joint operations should be formed as well as how joint requirements 
should be integrated into service acquisition programs. 
As stated in Chapter 1, the scope of this project does not include a cost analysis 
for joint versus single inspections.  Shrinking defense budgets require prudent use of 
limited funds.   Further research into costs will have to account for manpower hours to 
plan and coordinate joint and wing exercises as well as travel and equipment costs.  
Analysis of costs should be paired with the third purposed research area, effects of joint 
metrics/inspections on readiness. 
The recommendations of work include adding joint attributes to the AFIS 
inspection checklist as well as current exercises for implementing a joint SoS inspection 
architecture.  If implemented, further research should quantify the effects of joint 
metrics/inspections on readiness.  If possible, a potential “test” case of select wings and 
other services units could be used as a sample set.  Implement the new AFIS over this 
small sample set to determine feasibility and outcome (beneficial or not, to what extent, 
and at what cost). 
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Summary 
The ACC/IG is responsible for determining the readiness of ACC forces.  
Through the use of the AFIS, the IG reports the efficiency, effectiveness and combat 
readiness of units to the ACC/CC.  Through the use of checklists, interviews, and 
observation, the IG determines a unit’s ability to fulfill its wartime mission requirements.  
 Today’s wars however, are waged as a Joint Force, where the COCOM leverages 
the resources available to achieve a strategic outcome.  Objectives are met through the 
coordination and combination of military capabilities provided by the Army, Navy, and 
Air Force.  Battles are no longer fought by a single service or single weapons system, but 
as a collective one.  The joint force is a complex SoS, where the success of the whole 
relies on each individual component to fulfill their role within the structure.  This 
integration allows CCs to harness the synergistic effects of his/her forces to bring 
decisive firepower to the battlefield and exploit the enemy’s weakness. 
 Currently the AFIS inspects a single wing at a time to determine combat 
effectiveness.  The AFIS does not directly acknowledging the joint SoS architecture and 
the relationship between the SoS and subsystems.  The combat effectiveness of a wing is 
largely based on how well it operates within this larger SoS.  Given the ever-growing 
joint nature of the US military, the AFIS should assess units through a larger SoS 
framework.  Adapting this approach reduces integration risk prior to deployment and 
provides a better assessment of wing readiness.     
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Appendix A:  90-201 Checklist References 
The AFIS uses the following list of references to create the IG inspection 
checklist and evaluate unit readiness. 
1. Air Force Smart Operations for the 21st Century (AFSO21) Playbook, Oct 09  
2. AFI 10-201, Status of Resources and Training System, 19 Apr 13  
3. AFI 10-206, Operational Reporting, 6 Sep 11 AFI 10-207, Command Posts, 1 Feb 
12 
4. AFI 10-208, Air Force Continuity of Operations (COOP) Program, 15 Dec 11  
5. AFI 10-210, Prime Base Engineer Emergency Force (BEEF) Program, 6 Sep 12 
6.  AFI 10-245, Antiterrorism (AT), 21 Sep 12 AFI 10-250, Individual Medical 
Readiness, 9 Mar 07 
7. AFI 10-301, Responsibilities of Air Reserve Component (ARC) Forces, 16 Aug 06  
8. AFI 10-404, Base Support and Expeditionary (BAS&E) Site Planning, 11 Oct 11 
9.  AFI 10-701, Operations Security (OPSEC), 8 Jun 11  
10. AFI 10-702, Military Information Support Operations (MISO), 7 Jun 11 
11. AFI 10-704, Military Deception Program, 30 Aug 05  
12. AFI 10-2501, Air Force Emergency Management (EM) Program Planning and 
Operations, 24 Jan 07 
13. AFI 10-2603, Emergency Health Powers on Air Force Installations, 13 Oct 10 
14. AFI 10-2604, Disease Containment Planning (FOUO), 3 Sep 10 
15. AFI 11-2(MDS) Volume 1, Aircrew Training (Note: Published by MDS as 
applicable) 
16. AFI 11-2(MDS) Volume 2, Aircrew Evaluation Criteria (Note: Published by MDS 
as applicable) 
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17. AFI 11-2(MDS) Volume 3, MDS, Operations Procedures (Note: Published by MDS 
as applicable) 
18. AFI 11-202 Volume 1, Aircrew Training, 22 Nov 10  
19. AFI 11-202, Volume 2, Aircrew Standardization/Evaluation Program, 13 Sep 10 
20. AFI 11-202 Volume 3, General Flight Rules, 22 Oct 10  
21. AFI 11-230, Instrument Procedures, 30 Mar 10  
22. AFI 11-299, Nuclear Airlift Operations (FOUO), 19 Mar 08  
23. AFI 13-1AOCV1, Ground Environment Training—Air Operations Center (AOC), 7 
Dec 11 
24. AFI 13-1AOCV2, Standardization/Evaluation Program—Air and Space Operations 
Center, 1 Aug 05 
25. AFI 90-201 2 August 2013 101 
26. AFI 13-1AOCV3, Operational Procedures—Air Operations Center (AOC), 2 Nov 
11  
27. AFI 13-204, Volume 1, Airfield Operations Career Field Development, 9 May 13  
28. AFI 13-204, Volume 2, Airfield Operations Standardization and Evaluation, 01 Sep 
10  
29. AFI 13-204, Vol 3, Airfield Operations Procedures and Programs, 01 Sep 10 (Ch 1, 
9 Jan 10)  
30. AFI 13-216, Evaluation of Air Traffic Control and Landing Systems, 05 May 2005 
31. AFI 13-503, Nuclear-Capable Unit Certification, Decertification and Restriction 
Program, 2 Oct 12 
32. AFI 14-104, Oversight of Intelligence Activities, 23 Apr 12  
33. AFI 14-202V1, Intelligence Training, 10 Mar 08  
34. AFI 14-202V2 Intelligence Standardization/Evaluation Program, 10 Mar 08  
35. AFI 14-202V3, General Intelligence Rules, 10 Mar 08  
36. AFI 16-701, Special Access Programs, 1 Nov 95  
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37. AFI 16-1301, Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) Program, 6 Sep 06 
38. AFI 21-204, Nuclear Weapons Maintenance Procedures, 30 Nov 09  
39. AFI 31-101, Integrated Defense (FOUO), 8 Oct 09  
40. AFI 31-401, Information Security Program Management, 1 Nov 05  
41. AFI 31-501, Personnel Security Program Management, 27 Jan 05  
42. AFI 31-601, Industrial Security Program Management, 29 Jun 05  
43. AFI 32-7001, Environmental Management, 4 Nov 11  
44. AFI 33-150, Management of Cyberspace Support Activities, 30 Nov 11  
45. AFI 33-360, Publications and Forms Management, 7 Feb 13  
46. AFI 34-219, Alcoholic Beverage Program, 17 Oct 07  
47. AFI 35-101, Public Affairs Responsibilities and Management, 18 Aug 10  
48. AFI 35-102, Security and Policy Review Process, 20 Oct 09  
49. AFI 35-103, Public Affairs Travel, 26 Jan 10  
50. AFI 35-104, Media Operations, 22 Jan 10  
51. AFI 35-105, Community Relations, 26 Jan 10  
52. AFI 35-107, Public Web Communications, 21 Oct 09  
53. AFI 35-108, Environmental Public Affairs, 8 Mar 10 AFI 35-109, Visual 
Information, 12 Mar 10  
54. AFI 35-110, U.S. Air Force Band Program, 22 Jan 10  
55. AFI 35-111, Public Affairs Contingency Operations and Wartime Readiness, 28 
Oct 09  
56. AFI 35-113, Internal Information, 11 Mar 10 
57. 102 AFI 90-201 2 August 2013 
58. AFI 36-2201, Air Force Training Program, 15 Sep 10 
59. AFI 36-2640, Executing Total Force Development, 16 Dec 08 
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60. AFI 36-3009, Airman and Family Readiness Centers, 7 May 13 
61. AFI 36-3107, Voting Assistance Program, 10 Sep 03 
62. AFI 36-6001, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program, 29 Sep 08 
63. AFI 41-106, Medical Readiness Program Management, 1 Jul 11 
64. AFI 63-125, Nuclear Certification Program, 8 Aug 12 
65. AFI 64-117, Air Force Government-Wide Purchase Card (GPC) Program, 20 Sep 
11 
66. AFI 65-501, Economic Analysis, 29 Aug 11 
67. AFI 90-201 ANGSUP 1, Inspector General Activities, 2 Mar 10 
68. AFI 90-301, Inspector General Complaints Resolution, 23 Aug 11 
69. AFI 90-501, Community Action Information Board and Integrated Delivery 
System, 31 Aug 06 
70. AFI 90-505, Suicide Prevention Program, 10 Aug 12 
71. AFI 90-803, Environmental, Safety, and Occupational Health Compliance 
Assessment and Management Program, 24 Mar 10 
72. AFI 90-1001, Responsibilities for Total Force Integration, 29 May 07 AFI 91-101, 
Air Force Nuclear Weapons Surety Program, 13 Oct 10 
73. AFI 91-108, Air Force Nuclear Weapons Intrinsic Radiation and 91(B) Radioactive 
Material Safety Program, 21 Sep 10 
74. AFI 91-202, The US Air Force Mishap Prevention Program, 5 Aug 11 
75. AFI 91-204, Safety Investigations and Reports, 24 Sep 08 
76. AFI 91-207, The US Air Force Traffic Safety Program, 27 Oct 11 
77. AFI 91-302, Air Force Occupational and Environmental Safety, Fire Protection, and 
Health (AFOSH) Standards, 18 Apr 94 
78. AFJI 11-204, Operational Procedures for Aircraft Carrying Hazardous Materials, 11 
Nov 94  
79. AFMAN 11-226 (I), US Standard for Terminal Instrument Procedures (TERPS) 
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80. AFMAN 10-2502, Air Force Incident Management System (AFIMS) Standards and 
Procedures, 25 Sep 09 
81. AFMAN 10-2503, Operations in a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, 
and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Environment, 7 Jul 11 
82. AFMAN 10-2504, Air Force Incident Management Guidance for Major Accidents 
and Natural Disasters, 13 Mar 13 
83. AFMAN 10-2605, Education, Training and Exercise Competencies for Counter-
Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Operations, 30 Jun 08 
84. AFMAN 15-129V1, Air and Space Weather Operations – Characterization, 6 Dec 
11 
85. AFI 90-201 2 August 2013 103 
86. AFMAN 15-129V2, Air and Space Weather Operations—Exploitation, 07 Dec 11 
87.  AFMAN 33-363, Management of Records, 1 Mar 08  
88. AFMAN 65-506, Economic Analysis, 29 Aug 11  
89. AFMAN 91-201, Explosives Safety Standards, 12 Jan 11 
90. AFPD 10-7, Information Operations, 6 Sep 06 
91. AFPD 10-24, Air Force Critical Infrastructure Program (CIP), 28 Apr 06 
92. AFPD 10-25, Emergency Management, 26 Sep 07 
93. AFPD 14-1, Intelligence Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Planning, 
Resources, and Operations, 2 Apr 04 
94. AFPD 16-7, Special Access Programs, 29 Dec 10 
95. AFPD 32-70, Environmental Quality, 20 Jul 94 
96. AFPD 36-60, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program, 28 Mar 08 
97. AFPD 65-5, Cost and Economics, 5 Aug 08 
98. AFPD 90-2, Inspector General-The Inspection System, 26 Apr 06 
99. AFPD 90-8, Environment, Safety & Occupational Health Management and Risk 
Management, 2 Feb 12 
 
93 
 
100. AFOSII 90-201, Inspector General Activities, 2 May 05  
101. T.O. 11N-35-51, Department of Defense Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspection 
System, 19 Feb 08 
102. CG-W-5, Joint Nuclear Weapons Classification Guide 
103. CJCSI 3261.01B, Recapture and Recovery of Nuclear Weapons, 3 Nov 08 
104. CJCSI 3260.01C, Joint Policy Governing Positive Control Material and Devices, 30 
Jun 11 
105. CJCSI 3263.05, Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspections, 4 Jun 10 
106. Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP) 10-2 Template 
107. DOD 3150.2-M, DOD Nuclear Weapon System Safety Program Manual, 23 Dec 
1996 
108. DOD S-5210.41-M, The Air Force Nuclear Weapon Security Manual, 25 Apr 13 
109. DOD 5210.42-R_AFMAN 10-3902, Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability 
Program (PRP), 13 Nov 06 
110. DOD 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence 
Components that Affect United States Persons, 1 Dec 1982 
111. DOD 5400.7-R_AFMAN 33-302, Freedom of Information Act Program, 21 Oct 10 
112. DODI 1000.04, Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP), 13 Sep 12  
113. DODI 1100.22, Policy and Procedures for Determining Workforce Mix, 12 Apr 10  
114. DODD 1332.35, Transition Assistance for Military Personnel, 9 Dec 1993 
115. 104 AFI 90-201 2 August 2013 
116. DODD 3020.26, Department of Defense Continuity Programs, 9 Jan 09 
117. DODD 3020.40, DoD Policy and Responsibilities for Critical Infrastructure, 21 Sep 
12 
118. DODD 3150.02, DoD Nuclear Weapons Surety Program, 24 Apr 13. 
119. DODI 2200.01, Combating Trafficking in Persons (CTIP), 15 Sep 10 
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120. DODI 3020.45, Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIO) Management, 21 
Apr 08 
121. DODD 4715.1E, Environmental Safety and Occupational Health (ESOH), 19 Mar 
05 
122. DODI 4715.6, Environmental Compliance, 24 Apr 96 
123. DODI 4715.17, Environmental Management Systems, 15 Apr 09 
124. DODI 5210.89_AFI 10-3901, Minimum Security Standards for Safeguarding 
Biological Select Agents and Toxins, 22 Jun 10 
125. DODI 6495.02, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program Procedures, 23 
Jun 06 
126. DODI 6055.05, Occupational and Environmental Health, 11 Nov 08 
127. DODI 6055.1, DOD Safety and Occupational Health Program, 19 Aug 98 
128. DODI 6055.17, DOD Installation Emergency Management (IEM) Program, 28 Mar 
13 
129. DODM 5105.21-V1, Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) Administrative 
Security Manual: Administration of Information and Information Systems Security, 
21 Oct 12 
130. DODM 5105.21-V2, Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) Administrative 
Security Manual: Administration of Physical Security, Visitor Control, and 
Technical Security, 21 Oct 12 
131. DODM 5105.21-V3, Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) Administrative 
Security Manual: Administration of Personnel Security, Industrial Security, and 
Special Activities, 21 Oct 12 
132. DODM 5200.01V1, DOD Information Security Program: Overview, Classification, 
And Declassification, 24 Feb 12 
133. DODM 5200.01V2, DOD Information Security Program: Marking Of Classified 
Information, 24 Feb 12 
134. DODM 5200.01V3, DOD Information Security Program: Protection Of Classified 
Information, 24 Feb 12 
135. DODM 5200.01V4, DOD Information Security Program: Controlled Unclassified 
Information (CUI), 24 Feb 12 
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136. DOD IG Security and Counterintelligence Inspection Guidelines HAF Mission 
Directive (MD) 1-20, The Inspector General, 23 Apr 2008 
137. HQ USAF Program Action Directive (PAD) 13-01, Implementation of the 
Secretary of the United States Air Force Direction to Implement a New Air Force 
Inspection System, 10 Jun 2013 
138. Executive Order 12196, Occupational Safety and Health Programs for Federal 
Employees, 26 Feb 80 
139. Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities, 4 Dec 1981 
140. AFI 90-201 2 August 2013 105 
141. Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-8, National Preparedness, 30 Mar 11  
142. Executive Order 12333 as amended by EO 13284(2003), 13355(2004) and 
13470(2008) 
143. Executive Order 13423, Strengthening Federal Environmental, Energy, and 
Transportation Management, 24 Jan 07 
144. Executive Order 13526, Classified National Security Information, 05 Jan 2010 
145. Title 10 United States Code § 8020, Inspector General, Mar 04 
146. Title 10 United States Code § 8583, Requirement of Exemplary Conduct 
147. Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education, Policies and Procedures, 1 
Jul 2013 
148. Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5, Management of Domestic 
Incidents, 28 Feb 03 
149. National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) FY2008, House Record (H.R.) 4986, 
Section 1662, Access of Recovering Service Members to Adequate Outpatient 
Residential Facilities 
150. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 
151. National Response Framework (NRF), Jan 08 
152. Federal Continuity Directive 1 (FCD 1), Oct 12 
153. Federal Continuity Directive 2 (FCD 2), Oct 12 
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154. Joint Close Air Support (JCAS) Action Plan (AP) Memorandum of Agreement 
(MOA) 2004-01, Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) (Ground), 1 Jan 12 
155. JCAS AP MOA 2004-02, Joint Forward Air Controller (Airborne) (FAC(A)), 1 Feb 
12 ISO 14001 Environmental Management System Standard, 3 Nov 11 
156. Department Of Defense Initial Guidance for BRAC 2005 Joint Base 
Implementation, 22 January 08 
157. Fire Emergency Services Assessment Program (FESAP) Law of Armed Conflict 
(LOAC) 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Appendix B:  Risk Diamond Approach 
Exerts from Professors Shenhar and Dvir’s book Reinventing Project 
Management.  The below paragraphs provide Shenhar and Dvir’s definitions for the four 
dimensions and there different levels.   
Table 5:  NTCP dimensions and levels 
 
Novelty:  Product novelty is defined by how new the product is to its markets and 
potential users.  This dimension represents the extent to which customers are familiar 
with this kind of product, the way to use it, and its benefits.  It also represents the 
uncertainty of your project goal – that is, how clearly you can define the requirements 
and customer needs up front. 
• Derivative products are extensions and improvements of existing products 
• Platform products are new generations of existing product lines.  Such 
products replace previous products in a well-established market sector.  A 
typical example is a new car model. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Dimensions
	  	  	  Levels
Novelty Technology Complexity Pace
1 Derivative Low-­‐tech Assembly Regular
2 Platform Medium-­‐tech System Fast/Competitive
3 Breakthrough High-­‐tech Array Time-­‐critical
4 Super-­‐high-­‐tech Blitz
NTCP	  Model
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• Breakthrough products are new-to-the-world products.  They transform a new 
concept or a new idea into a new product that customers have never seen 
before.  The first Sony Walkman and the first 3M Post-it notes are typical 
examples 
Technology:  The major source of task uncertainty is technological uncertainty. 
Technological uncertainty has an impact on, among other things, design and testing, 
communication and interaction, the timing of design freeze, and the needed number of 
design cycles.  It also affects the technical competence needed by the project manager 
and project team members.   
• Low-tech projects rely on existing and well-established technologies.  The 
most typical examples are construction projects. 
• Medium-tech projects use mainly existing or base technologies but 
incorporate a new technology or a new feature that did not exist in previous 
products.  Examples include products in stable industries, such as appliances, 
automobiles, or heavy equipment 
• High-tech projects represent situations in which most of the technologies 
employed are new to the firm but already exist and are available at project 
initiation.  Most computer and defense development projects belong to this 
category 
• Super-high-tech projects are based on new technologies that do not exist at 
project initiation.  Although the mission is clear, the solution is not, and new 
technologies must be developed during the project.  A good example is the 
moon-landing program 
Complexity:  Project complexity is directly related to system scope and affects 
project organization and the formality of project management.  Three typical levels of 
complexity are used to distinguish among project management practices.  A lower scope 
level can be seen as a subsystem of the next higher level.   
• Assembly projects involve creating a collection of elements, components, and 
modules combined into a single unit or entity that performs a single function.  
 
99 
 
Assembly projects may produce a simple stand-alone product (such as a CD 
player or a coffee machine) or build a subsystem of a larger system (such as 
an automobile transmission).  They may also involve building a new 
organization that is responsible for a single function (such as payroll). 
• System projects involve a complex collection of interactive elements and 
subsystems, jointly performing multiple functions to meet a specific 
operational need.  System projects may build products such as cars, 
computers, or buildings, or they may deal with the creation of entire new 
businesses that include several functions.   
• Array projects deal with a large, widely dispersed collection of systems that 
function together to achieve a common purpose (sometimes they are called 
“systems of systems” or “super systems”).  Examples of arrays include 
national communications networks, a mass transit infrastructure, or regional 
power distribution networks, as well as entire corporations. 
Pace:  On this scale, projects differ by urgency (or how much time is available) 
and by what happens if time goals are not met.  Pace impacts the autonomy of project 
teams, the bureaucracy, the speed of decision making, and the intensity of top 
management involvement.   
• Regular projects are those efforts where time is not critical to immediate 
organizational success. 
• Fast/competitive projects are the most common projects carried out by 
industrial and profit-driven organizations.  They are typically conceived to 
address market opportunities, create a strategic positioning, or form new 
business lines. 
• Time-critical projects must be completed by a specific date, which is 
constrained by a definite event or a window of opportunity.  Missing the 
deadline means project failure.  Examples might be the launch of a space 
vehicle based on a specific cosmic constellation, or the Y2K project.   
• Blitz projects are the most urgent, most time-critical.  These are crisis 
projects.  Solving the crisis as fast as possible is the criterion for success.   
  
 
100 
 
Bibliography 
15th Intel Squadron. (2011). The State of Wing Intel. Air Combat Command, US Air 
Force. Langley AFB: Air Combat Command/A2. 
99th Air Base Wing Public Affairs. (2012, Feb). U.S. Air Force Fact Sheet. Retrieved 
from 414TH COMBAT TRAINING SQUADRON "RED FLAG": 
http://www.nellis.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet_print.asp?fsID=19160&page=1 
Air Combat Command. (2013). Air Combat Command. Retrieved from Air Combat 
Command: http://www.acc.af.mil/main/welcome.asp 
Air Combat Command. (2013, July 16). Air Combat Command Fact Sheet. Retrieved 
from Air Combat Command Fact Sheet: 
http://www.acc.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=2361 
Barnhart, D. C. (n.d.). AF Strategy that Drives Our Cyber Acquisition. 14 slides. 
Blacklock, J., & Zalcman, L. (2010). USAF Distributed Mission Operations, and ADF 
Synthetic Range Interoperability Model and an AOD Mission Training Centre 
Capability Concept Demonstrator - What Are They and Why Does the RAAF Need 
Them? Victoria: Air Operations Division. 
Boland, R. (2013, June 1). Razor Talon Sharpens Services' Synergy. Retrieved April 25, 
2014, from AFCEA: http://www.afcea.org/content/?q=node/11119 
Carney, J. T., & Schemmer, B. F. (2002). No Room For Error: The Covert Operations of 
America's Special Tactics Units from Iran to Afghanistan. New York : Random 
House Publishing Group. 
Catanzano, K. (2011). Enhanced Training for a 21st-Century Military. Chantilly: Booz 
Allen Hamilton. 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2008). CJCS 3100.01B: Joint Strategic Planning 
System. Washington D.C.: Department of Defense. 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2013). CJCS Guide to the Chairman's Readiness 
System. Department of Defense. Washington D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2011). CJCSI 3141.01E Management and Review 
of Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. Washington D.C.: Department of Defense. 
 
101 
 
Cushman, J. H. (1985). Command and Control of Theater Forces: Adequacy. 
Washington D.C.: AFCEA International Press. 
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. (2005). 2005 Defense Base Closure 
and Reallignment Commission Report (Vol. 1). Arlington, Virginia, USA: 
Department of Defense. 
Department of Defense. (2009). DoDD 1322.18, Military Training. Washington D.C: 
DoD. 
Department of Defense. (2004). System of Systems Engineering. In Defense Acquisition 
Guidebook. Washington DC: DoD. 
Fogarty, P. F. (2006). Joint Operations: Organizational Flaws in Goldwater-Nichols. 
U.S. Army War College, U.S. Army. Carlisle Barracks: United States Air War 
College. 
Furr, W. F. (1991). Joint Doctrine: Progress, Prospect, and Problems. Airpower Journal , 
V (3), 44. 
Gadsden, J., & Outteridge, C. (2006). What value analysis? The Historical Record of 
Fratricide. Great Britian: Defense Science and Technology Laboratory. 
Government Accountability Office. (1998). Joint Training: Observations on the 
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Exercise Program. Washington D.C.: GAO. 
Government Accountability Office. (2005). Military Training: Funding Requests for 
Joint Urban Operations Training and Facilities Should Be Base on Sound Strategy 
and Requirements. Washington D.C.: GAO. 
Government Accountability Office. (1992). Operation Desert Storm: War offers 
Important Insight Into Army and Marine Corps Training Needs. Washington D.C.: 
GAO. 
Hart, R. J. (2004). Fratricide: A Dilemma which is Manageable at Best. Newport: Naval 
War College. 
Headquarters US Air Force. (2014). History of the Air Force Inspector General. 
Washingon D.C.: Headquarters US Air Force. 
 
102 
 
Hewett, K. J., & Webb, C. M. (2010). An Analysis of U.S. Army Fratricide Incidents 
during the Global War on Terror. Fort Detrick: U.S. Army Medical Research and 
Material Command. 
Hoing, L. J. (2003). Executing Operational Readiness for Fixed Wing Tactical Avaition 
Units. Fort Leavenworth: United States Army Command and General Staff College. 
Horne, D. L. (2013). U.S. Air Force Fact Sheet: Virtual Flag. Kirland AFB: US Air 
Force. 
Hostage, G. M. (2014). Air Combat Command Key Talking Points. Air Combat 
Command, U.S. Air Force. Langley AFB: Air Combat Command. 
Hostage, G. M. (2012). Air Combat Command Strategic Plan: Securing the High 
Ground. Langley AFB, VA, USA: Air Combat Command. 
Janiszewski, C. J. (2014, April 22). Q&A: Colonel John T. Janiszewski. (K. M. Sean 
Carmichael, Interviewer) 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2003). An Evolving Joint Perspective: US Joint Warfare and Crisis 
Resolution In the 21st Century. Washington D.C.: Department of Defense. 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2011). Department of Defense Dictonary of Military and 
Associated Terms. Washington D.C.: Department of Defense. 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2009). Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. 
Washington DC: Department of Defense. 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2011). Joint Operation Plan. Joint Staff, Department of Defense. 
Washington D.C.: Department of Defense. 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2013). JP 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. 
Washington D.C.: Department of Defense. 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2000). JP 1: Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United 
States. Washington D.C.: Department of Defense. 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2008). JP 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms. Washington D.C: Department of Defense. 
 
103 
 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2014). JP 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms. Department of Defense. Department of Defense. 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2011). JP 3-0: Joint Operations. DoD. Washington D.C.: Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2007). JP 3-35: Deployment and Redeployment Operations. 
Washington DC: Department of Defence. 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2011). JP 5-0: Joint Operation Planning. DoD. Washington D.C: 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
Joint Staff-7. (2011). Planner's Handbook for Operational Design. Joint Staff, 
Department of Defense. Washington D.C.: Department of Defense. 
Kapp, L., & Torreon, B. S. (2013). Reserve Component Personnel Issues: Questions and 
Answers. Congressional Research Service. Washington D.C.: Congressional Research 
Service. 
Kirtland AFB Public Affairs Office. (2014). 705 Combat Training Squadron. ACC, 
USAF. Kirtland AFB: Kirtland AFB Public Affairs Office. 
Locker, J. R. (2001). Has it Worked? Goldwater-Nichols Reogranization Act. Naval War 
College Review , 54 (4), 95-115. 
McCullough, A. (2012, September). What's Next for the AEF. Air Force Magazine: 
Online Journal of the Air Force Association , 95 (9), pp. 58-61. 
Mullins, M. (2011). 2011 National Military Strategy. Washington D.C.: Department of 
Defense. 
Newberry, B. M. (2005). To TPFDD or not to TPFDD: Is the TPFDD Outdated for 
Expeditionary US Military Operations? US Army Command and General Staff 
College, School of Advanced Military Studies. Fort Leavenworth: US Army 
Command and General Staff College. 
ODUSD(A&T)SSE. (2008). Systems Engineering Guide for Systems of Systems (Version 
1 ed.). (S. a. Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and 
Technology, Ed.) Washington D.C., US: Department of Defense. 
Rasmussen, R. E. (2007). The Wrong Target. Norfolk: Joint Forces Staff College. 
 
104 
 
Ross, M. D. (2012, March 23). AEF Next: What is Next for Security Forces. 32. Carlisle , 
PA, USA: US Army War College. 
SAF/CIO A6. (2010). Air Force Modeling and Simulation Vision for the 21st Century. 
Washington D.C.: Headquarters Air Force. 
Santacrose, M. A. (2011). Planning for Planners Vol 1: Joint Operation Planning 
Process . United States Navy, Department of Defense. Dahlgren: United States Navy 
Warfare Center. 
Secretary of the Air Force. (2012). AFI 10-401: Air Force Operations Planning and 
Execution. Washington DC: Department of Air Force. 
Secretary of the Air Force. (2008). AFI 10-403: Deployment Planning and Execution. 
Washington DC: Department of the Air Force. 
Secretary of the Air Force. (2012). AFI 90-201: Inspector General Activities. Washington 
DC: Secretary of the Air Force (SAF/IGI). 
Senate Committee on Armed Services. (1985). Defense Organization: The Need for 
Change. 99th Congress. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office. 
Shenhar, A. J., & Dvir, D. (2007). Reinventing Project Management: The Diamond 
Approach to Successful Growth and Innovation. Boston: Harvard Business School 
Press. 
Shwedo, B. J.-2. (2013, Dec 16). MEMORANDUM FOR EXERCISE VIRTUAL FLAG 
UNIT INTEL PARTICIPANTS. Exercise VIRTUAL FLAG (VF) Desired Learning 
Objectives (DLOs) . Langley AFB, Virginia, USA: ACC/A2. 
Trunkey, R. D. (2013). Implications of the Department of Defense Readiness and 
Reporting System. Congressional Budget Office. Washington D.C.: CBO. 
U.S. Joint Forces Command. (n.d.). Global Force Management Joint Force Provider. 
Norfolk, VA, USA: U.S. Joint Forces Command Public Affairs Office. 
United States Air Force. (2011, October). AFPMAN 36-2241: Professional Development 
Guide. 
United States Air Force. (2013). Air Force Instruction 90-201: Air Force Inspection 
System. Washington DC: Department of the Air Force. 
 
105 
 
United States Air Force Scientific Advisory Board. (2005). System-of-Systems 
Engineering for Air Force Capability Development. US Air Force, DoD. Washington 
D.C.: SAB. 
United States Congress. (1986). Goldwater Nichols Department of Defence 
Reorganization Act of 1986. Washington DC: United States Congress. 
US Army. (2004). FM 1-02: Operational Terms and Graphics. US Army. Washington 
D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army. 
Williams, T. B. (2013). Air Combat Command Expeditionary Warfard. Briefing. 
Yin, R. K. (2012). Applications of Case Study Research (3 ed.). Washington D.C.: Sage. 
Yin, R. K. (2009). Case Study Research: Design and Methods (4 ed., Vol. 5). (L. 
Bickman, & D. J. Rog, Eds.) Washington D.C.: Sage. 
 
 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE 
Form Approved 
OMB No. 074-0188 
The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining 
the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information.  Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of the collection of information, including suggestions for 
reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA  
22202-4302.  Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a 
currently valid OMB control number.   
PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS. 
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 
19-06-2014 
2. REPORT TYPE  
Master’s Thesis 
3. DATES COVERED (From – To) 
 January 2014 –June 2014 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 
Air Force Inspection System:  An Application For System-Of-Systems (Sos) 
Engineering 
5a.  CONTRACT NUMBER 
5b.  GRANT NUMBER 
 
5c.  PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 
6. AUTHOR(S) 
 
Lay, Joseph R, Captain, USAF 
 
5d.  PROJECT NUMBER 
      
5e.  TASK NUMBER 
5f.  WORK UNIT NUMBER 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAMES(S) AND ADDRESS(S) 
 Air Force Institute of Technology 
Graduate School of Engineering and Management (AFIT/EN) 
2950 Hobson Way, Building 640 
WPAFB OH 45433-8865 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
    REPORT NUMBER 
 
 AFIT-ENV-T-14-J-25 
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Intentionally Left Blank 
 
10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 
      
11.  SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
Distribution Statement A:  Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  
This material is declared a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. 
14. ABSTRACT  
The Air Combat Command (ACC) Inspector General (IG) assesses the operational readiness and combat effectiveness of 
units by evaluating individual wings.  Today’s conflicts; however, are waged as a joint force.  The Joint Forces Commander 
(JFC) leverages the resources of the entire military complex to achieve strategic objectives.  The synergistic effects, created 
by the integration of individual weapon systems, produce greater results than the individual components.  Evaluating wings 
outside the joint System of Systems (SoS) architecture does not provide a true assessment of combat readiness.  Using a case 
study method, this research examines the idea of integrating a joint SoS architecture with the ACC/IG inspection system.  
First, this study assesses the current nature of military operations and the risks associated with joint operations.  Next, it 
defines several joint attributes to enhance the ACC/IG inspection checklist.  Further, it outlines several joint exercises as 
areas for implement a joint inspection system.  Finally, this study explores limitations and counter arguments to adopting a 
joint SoS into the inspection system.  Based on this analysis, the ACC/IG should assess units through a larger system-of-
system framework, which offers the possibility to reduce integration risks prior to deployment, and provide a better 
assessment of wing readiness 
15. SUBJECT TERMS 
Air Combat Command (ACC), combat effectiveness, joint inspection, system of systems (SoS), integration, 
interoperability, operational readiness, risk 
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION 
OF  
     ABSTRACT 
 
UU 
18. NUMBER  
OF PAGES 
 
106 
19a.  NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON 
Dr. John Colombi, ENV 
a. REPORT 
 
U 
b. ABSTRACT 
 
U 
c. THIS PAGE 
 
U 
19b.  TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code) 
(937) 255-3636, x 3347        (john.colombi@afit.edu) 
   Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18 
 
